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Abstract 
R. WALTON MOORE AND VIRGINIA POLITICS, 1933- 1941 
By Daniel Gregory Tulli, M.A. 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Arts at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2006 
Thesis Director: Dr. John Kneebone, Associate Professor, History Department 
This study is a chronicle of the efforts of R. Walton Moore and the Roosevelt 
Administration to liberalize the conservative Virginia Democratic Party during the 
1930's. Moore was an elderly politician and ama.teur historian who had been in and out 
politics in the state for over forty years. He was opposed at every turn in his efforts by 
state Democratic Party organizatioil leader Senator Harry F. Byrd, and his conservative 
colleague Senator Carter Glass. Both Glass and Byrd opposed most New Deal legislation 
throughout the decade. Moore served officially as Assistant Secretary of State and 
Counselor to the State Department, but his unofficial role was an advocate for Virginia's 
anti-organization Democrats. These Democrats were generally supportive of the New 
Deal and its programs, but wielded little political power because of the tight control with 
which Byrd and Glass distributed patronage. This essay traces Moore's three major 
efforts to align the Democratic Party in the Old Dominion closer to the Roosevelt 
Administra.tion. 
Introduction 
On September 19, 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Robert Walton 
Moore Assistant Secretary of state.' Moore received the office largely on the strength of 
his relationship with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, whom he had known in the House 
of Representatives. In appointing Moore to the post, FDR gained not only an Assistant 
Secretary, but an experienced Virginia politician who would serve as a valuable ally and 
political emissary in a state domiiiated by the conservative Democratic Senator Carter 
Glass and Senator Harry F. Byrd, leader of the state's political organization. Moore, a 
lifelong Fairfax, Virginia, resident, had been involved in state politics since he was 
elected a member of the state senate in 1887. He went on to serve as a member of 
Virginia's constitutional convention in 1901 - 1902 and most recently as U.S. 
Congressman from the Eighth District from 19 19 to his retirement in 193 1. After his 
retirement from Congress, he served on the State Board of Education for Virginia for two 
years. In addition to these acknowledged political offices, he also maintained a large 
number of contacts in the state, due in part to his service as president of the State Bar 
Association of ~ i r ~ i n i a . ~  
Prior to his service in the Roosevelt Administration Moore had not been openly 
antagonistic to the organization in Virginia but was viewed as strongly independent, one 
of several "mavericks beyond Organization control." Despite this perception he was 
' Ironically, the only condition that Secretary of State Hull placed on Moore's appointment was the 
approval of Virginia's two Senators, both of whom approved. R. Walton Moore unpublished 
autobiography, p.111-112, Box 2, Barbara L. Gellman Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, 
NY. 
2 Memorandum, October 11, 1935, Box 11, R. Walton Moore Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. 
asked to run for Governor in 1929 by Senator Glass and Senator Claude Swanson, but 
declined because of health reasons at the time.3 While the possibility remains that their 
request that Moore run for Governor was legitimate, it was most likely a courtesy that 
was extended by the senators knowing Moore would refused the honor because of his 
age, seventy at the time. There is no evidence that Byrd, who had assumed control of the 
organization in 1924 and was currently governor, ever strongly considered anyone but 
John Pollard, his eventual successor. This episode demonstrates the organization's 
perception of Moore in 1929 as a valued outsider, not a political enemy. 
Moore was also a man with a deep sense of Virginia's history and the history of 
the nation. He frequently gave public addresses on the Revolutionary Era or more 
specifically on one of the founding fathers. George Washington, whose home, Mount 
Vernon, was in Moore's home county of Fairfax, was a favorite topic.4 He often 
mentioned to others that he was a descendant of Lewis Morris, a signer of the Declaration 
of Independence. This background is important because throughout his tenure in the 
Roosevelt Administration Moore would repeatedly use history as a device for defending 
the Administration's positions and assailing its critics in Virginia. 
After his initial appointment in September 1933, the Assistant Secretary had little 
immediate involvement in Virginia politics, and his role in the administration was largely 
confined to his diplomatic responsibilities in the State Department. With the exception of 
3 Ronald L. Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996), 49. 
Moore Autobiography, p. 108, Box 2, Gellman Papers. 
R. Walton Moore, "Anniversary of the Birth of Washington" (Address at the annual Washington banquet 
of the Sons of the American Revolution in Pittsburgh on 21 February 1925), Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Senator Glass, the Virginia congressional delegation had largely supported the 
emergency measures of 1933, including two of Roosevelt's staunchest future Virginia 
adversaries, Senator Harry F. Byrd and Representative Howard W. Smith, who had been 
elected to Moore's old seat in the Eighth ~istrict."his level of general support for the 
Administration's policies remained reasonably consistent from Smith and Byrd, who 
supported "all except three of the Roosevelt measures" at the 1934 congressional session 
prior to the mid-tern  election^.^ This relative solidarity was evident when on October 19, 
1934, Roosevelt embarked on a brief whistle stop campaign tour of Virginia with Byrd, 
Glass, Representative Clifton Woodrum, and new Governor George Peery, an 
organization man. After the trip Glass wrote to FDR saying "it was inspiring to witness 
the tribute of personal affection by so-many Virginians for their President. They seemed 
so eager to 'go all the way with you' whether their Senior Senator was so minded or 
not."7 Glass's letter to the President was an acknowledgment of the growing popularity of 
the New Deal in Virginia by someone who consistently voted against it. Enjoying this 
5 Robert F Hunter.,"Carter Glass, Harry Byrd and the New Deal, 1932-1936," Virginia Social Science 
Journal 4 (1969), 93. Hunter notes that Byrd did oppose the Beer Bill and the National Industrial Recovery 
Act. For Smith's support of the early New Deal see Bruce J. Dierenfield "Congressman Howard W. 
Smith," (PhD. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1981), 63-64. 
6 Byrd to Charles J. Harkrader, July 9, 1934, 1926-1936 Correspondence with Harry F. Byrd file, Box 
9707, Charles J. Harkrader Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, VA. At the 1934 Session 
Byrd opposed "the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty.. ., amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment 
Adnlinistration Act and the confirmation of Rexford Tugwell,".Ibid., Dierenfield, "Congressman Howard 
W. Smith," 7 1. 
7 Glass to FDR, October 23, 1934, President's Personal File, Box 1588, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, 
Frarklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Letter quoted in Cash A. Koeniger, "The New Deal and the 
States: Roosevelt Versus the Byrd Organization in Virginia," Journal of American History 68 (March 
1982): 879. 
level of wide-spread support Roosevelt and his subordinates felt little need to intervene in 
Virginia politics during the first two years of his presidency. 
The little involvement Moore had in Virginia politics during his first year in 
office took the form, as it often would, of denunciations of contentions that the many of 
the founding fathers, including Thomas Jefferson, would not have approved of the 
administration's policies.8 But by the time of the mid-term elections in the fall of 1934, 
the seeds of conflict thai would draw seventy-five-year-old R. Walton Moore into an 
emerging political battle already had been sown. Harry Hopkins, the administrator of the 
Federal Emergency Relief Agency, had forced a heated exchange with organization 
governor George Peery over the amount of state relief Virginia was providing its 
 citizen^.^ At the heart of the matter were competing political ideologies. Peery, who, like 
Byrd, "would tolerate no deficit spending" at the state level, had no problem making sure 
Virginia received her fair portion of federal funds if Washington chose to spend beyond 
10 its means. To the contrary, Hopkiiis insisted that as a result of the creation of Federal 
Emergency Relief Agency by Congress it "was understood that the states would utilize 
their own resources before Federal aid could be expected."'l In the short term, Byrd7s and 
Glass's political strength prevented the termination of FERA sponsored relief payments 
8 Moore to FDR, July 6, 1934, President's Personal File, Box 1588, Roosevelt Papers. 
Hopkins to Peery, October 4, 1934, Peery to Hopkins, October 17, 1934, Hopkins to Peery, October 25, 
1934, Box 15 1, Peery Executive Papers, Library of Virginia, Richmond, VA. 
10 Fry, Joseph A. "The Organization in Control: George Campbell Peery, Governor of Virginia, 1934- 
1938," 270. In The Governors of Virginia, 1860-1978, ed. Edward Younger and James T. Moore 
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1982.) 
I I Hopkins to Peery, October 25, 1934, Box 15 1, Peery Executive Papers. Fry, "The Organization in 
Control" states that "From 1933 to 1935 the FERA has poured over $26 million into Virginia and paid over 
90 percent of the state's relief bill." 270. 
to Virginia. But viewing the conflict between Hopkins and Peery from a wider 
perspective it was perhaps the most visible signal of the difference in governing 
philosophy between the Roosevelt Administration and the organization-dominated state 
government of Virginia. The Roosevelt Administration could expect little state help from 
Virginia in financing its domestic aid programs. The dilemma was best summarized by 
Virginia historian Virginius Dabney, who wrote "Virginia limited its relief program to 
putting the unemployed to work on the highways, most of which [was] money that would 
have been spent on the roads anyway. The Old Dominion's relief problem was less 
severe than almost any other, but it was bad enough, and the Commonwealth put almost 
all the burden on Uncle sam."12 
As the fall of 1934 turned into the winter and spring of 1935, it became apparent 
to some in the Roosevelt Administration that Virginia's political support for its efforts to 
combat the effects of the depression was tenuous at best. As the administration launched 
a series of ambitious reform proposals called by some historians the "Second New 
~ e a l , " ' ~  the growing opposition aniong many in Virginia's congressional delegation, as 
well as the slow reaction of the state government in implementing landmark federal aid 
programs such as Social Security, led to a reappraisal of the political situation in Virginia 
by the administration. Chief among those examining the opposition of the majority of 
Virginia's elected representatives to the New Deal was Moore. Confiding in fellow 
Virginian William E. Dodd, who was serving as Ambassador to Germany, Moore wrote 
12 Virginius Dabney Virginia: The New Dominion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971),493. 
l 3  For an example see Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938 (New York: Capricorn Books, 
1944), 156. 
that despite the opposition of organization Democrats to the New Deal, "the sentiment in 
Virginia seems quite o ther~ise ." '~  ~ o o r e ' s  feelings were an accurate reading of the 
growing political dichotomy in Virginia where the electorate divided loyalties between 
Roosevelt's New Deal and the security it helped to provide and the Virginia senators, 
"their favorite sons who were trying to protect them from high taxes and federal 
interference."15 
By the summer of 1935, R. Walton Moore had assumed the role he played until 
1941. In this role he served FDR as political adviser on Virginia and national politics, as 
an emissary to Virginia's senators, who from 1935 onward both consistently opposed the 
administration's domestic policies, and as a willing hand to those Democrats in Virginia 
who sought to support the administration. His first task: help assure that Virginia's 
political elite stood united for Roosevelt in 1936. 
l 4  R. Walton Moore to William E. Dodd, July 26, 1935, Box 17, R. Walton Moore Papers, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Quote also cited in Henry C. Ferrell Claude Swanson: A Political 
Biography (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 2 15. 
l5 Ronald Heinemann Depression and New Deal in Virginia: The Enduring Dominion (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1983), 153. 
Chapter I 
Into the Fray: Tlie 1936 Presidential Election 
By the fall of 1935 Virginia's support of the president's reelection in 1936 was R. 
Walton Moore's top political priority. For Moore, this meant gaining the public support 
of Virginia's two influential senators and seeking the help of other high-profile 
Democrats around the state. The fact that Glass, and later Byrd, had repeatedly voiced 
their philosophical objections to Roosevelt's domestic policies made Moore's task very 
difficult. He had four main objectives: assuring Glass of White House support for his re- 
election as senator, ensuring that Senator Byrd disavowed any third party movement, 
distancing the administration from anti-organization attacks made on Glass and Byrd, 
and, most important, having each senator publicly endorse the president's reelection in a 
campaign speech. 
In late August Moore had paid a visit to Senator Glass to begin what would be 
over a year-long effort to gain a public endorsement of Roosevelt's reelection from both 
of the commonwealth's conservative Democratic senators. According to Glass, "Moore 
spent an hour.. .assuring me of the President's affection and his desire to have me 
reelected and also assuring me of his own personal and political devotion."16 Glass told 
Moore that he was being opposed for reelection by people he felt were "friends" of the 
White House, including the publisher of the Portsmouth Star, Norman Hamilton. Moore, 
for the first of many times, disavowed any connection to Hamilton and turned to the 
16 Glass to Byrd, August 30, 1935, 1935-1936 A-M file, Box 341, Carter Glass Papers, University of 
Virginia Library. 
subject of Byrd's support for FDR. Moore encouraged Glass to have Byrd "go and assure 
the President of [his] s~~pport" which Glass declined to do. 
In a meeting the following day with the president, Glass told FDR that "his 
friends" had objected to the inclusion of Glass's name with the formation of Roosevelt 
Clubs in Virginia. Just as Moore had done the day before, Roosevelt disassociated 
himself from those had who opposed Glass and then sought through him to obtain the 
support of Senator Byrd. Roosevelt told Glass that Byrd "should disavow all sympathy 
with a third party opposition ticket."" The third party the President referred to was that 
being launched by publisher William Randolph Hearst, who sought to establish a party of 
"independent conservative Democrats" to oppose Roosevelt's re-nomination. Hearst had 
gone so far as to suggest Byrd as a nullling mate on a ticket headed by former 
Democratic nominee Alfred E. smith.'' Byrd's and Glass's consistent opposition to the 
New Deal made them appear likely to be sympathetic to such a group. While Glass said 
little publicly about the meeting with FDR, the Richmond Times-Dispatch saw it as a 
presidential endorsement of Glass for reelection to his Senate seat.19 
In relaying the highlights of his meeting to Moore a couple of days later, Glass 
wrote that he told the president that Byrd would come and see him to assure FDR of his 
support provided that he was invited. He also told Moore that both he and Byrd favored 
" Ibid. 
18 New York Times, August 29 1935 
l9 Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 29, 1935 
an instructed Virginia delegation for Roosevelt at the Democratic National  onv vent ion.^^ 
While Byrd had already publicly labeled the idea of his running on the independent ticket 
"ab~urd,"~' Moore continued to be bothered by the junior senator's carefully chosen 
words supporting Roosevelt's reelection bid. The phrase that most bothered Moore was 
printed in Byrd's paper, the Winchester Star, and read that "under present conditions" 
Byrd would support an instructed delegation at the Virginia Democratic Convention. The 
reservation in this statement bothered Moore so much that he asked Glass to intervene on 
his behalf in support of the president receiving an instructed delegation from Virginia 
despite Glass's previous assurances. Moore feared that Byrd "might very well resent any 
suggestion from me, but you of all men are his friend.. . ,922 
Moore's actions in seeking to assure Byrd's support for an instructed Virginia 
delegation at the national convention are revealing about his relationships with Byrd and 
Glass. Moore and Glass had a history spanning at least thirty-five years by 1935. Just a 
year apart in age, they had both served in the Virginia State Senate and were "desk mates 
at the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901 ."23 Moore had also served in congress 
in the 1920s while Glass was in the senate. Despite Glass's consistent opposition to the 
New Deal, they remained on polite and even friendly terms. A similarly cordial 
20 Glass to Moore, September 2, 1935, 1935-1936 A-M file, Box 341, Glass Papers. 
21 Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 30, 1935 
22 Moore to Glass, September 5, 1935, G Personal file 1936-1937, Box 24, Moore Papers. 
23 Moore to FDR, February, 8, 1939, Roberts file, Box 17, Moore Papers. 
relationship also existed during the first term between FDR and Glass, who would often 
address his letters to the President "My dear old friend."24 
The same cannot be said for Moore's relationship with Byrd, whose 
correspondence indicates little coiltact with Moore other than some complaints about the 
Hoover Administration's handling of the federal loan program administered by the 
Agriculture Department while Byrd was governor of Virginia and Moore was in 
~ a t e r ,  according to Moore, when he asked Glass to support him for the 
position of Assistant Secretary of State in 1933 he "expressed his great pleasure, but 
without doing that Senator Byrd said that I would have his vote."26 The origin of the icy 
nature of the relationship between Byrd and Moore is unknown, but it is reasonable to 
infer that it derives partly from their difference in age (Moore was nearly thirty years his 
senior), their respective relationships to the organization and their historical outlook.27 
Byrd was also not as cordial with Roosevelt as Glass, having been out maneuvered for 
the Democratic Nomination by FDR in 1932. 
In addition to seeking a renunciation of any third term movement by Senator 
Byrd, Moore also sought throughout September 1935 to assure Glass that neither he nor 
anyone else in the administration was helping Randolph Leigh, a supporter of the New 
Deal from Fairfax, in his bid to unseat Glass in the Democratic primary. Moore advised 
24 Glass to FDR, October 23, 1934, President's Personal File 1588, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers. 
25 Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia, 1 17 
26 Moore unpublished autobiography, 112, R. Walton Moore file, box 2, Gellrnan Papers. 
'' For a discussion of Moore's differences with Byrd on historical issues see for example a discussion on 
the doctrine of states' rights, Moore to Glass, September 17, 1935. 
Glass that he felt his election "was as certain as in anything in the fu t~~ re  can be," and that 
the Senator should not see Leigh's candidacy as a threat.28 Glass wrote back several days 
later acknowledging Moore's assurances, and letting him know that he had already been 
given some information on Leigh "and would attend to him should it seem desirable." He 
also implicitly noted the president's condemnation of Leigh's candidacy, writing that 
publication of Roosevelt's comments on the subject would immediately "dispose" of 
~ e i ~ h . ~ ~  Moore followed up several weeks later relaying to Glass the details of a meeting 
he had with Randolph Leigh. Moore had told Leigh "of the absurdity of opposing" Glass 
and speculated on the fact that his candor may have helped force Leigh's early 
withdrawal from the race.30 The administration's lack of cooperation with the challenger 
was made more evident when Moore told Glass that one of the President's secretaries, 
Marvin Mchtyre, had informed Leigh that he "need not expect any assistance from the 
White ~ o u s e . " ~ '  In fact, several months later, Glass's Democratic nomination petition 
included the signatures of "the four Virginians most conspicuously associated with 
Roosevelt," Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson, Veterans Appeal Board Chairman 
John Garland, Special Assistant to the Attorney General Robert N. Anderson, and not 
surprisingly, Assistant Secretary of State, R. Walton ~ o o r e . ' ~  
28 Moore to Glass, September 5, 1935, G personal file 1936-1937, Box 24, Moore Papers. 
29 Glass to Moore, September 9, 1935, 1935-1936 A-M file, Box 341, Glass Papers. 
30 Moore to Glass, September 17, 1935, 1935-1936 A-M file, Box 341, Glass Papers. 
31 Moore to Glass, October 1, 1935, G personal file (copy) 1936-1937, Box 24, Moore Papers. Ibid., Moore 
to Glass, October 3, 1935. 
32 Alfred Cash Koeniger, "'Unreconstructed Rebel': The Political Thought and Senate Career of Carter 
Glass, 1929-1936," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1980), 212. 
The efforts of Moore and Roosevelt in the fall of 1935 reveal not only the delicate 
nature of their respective relationships with Virginia's Senators, but also the enormous 
sway Glass and Byrd held over Virginia's Democratic voters. While the New Deal 
remained popular in Virginia, so did Glass and Byrd, whose opposition was largely 
viewed as principled in nature. Historian Ronald Heinemann put forth the idea that 
Virginia voters while approving of the New Deal, sought to place a check on its excesses 
in the form of its conservative senators.33 
This dual rationale proved to be valid because of the consistently high marks 
Roosevelt had received in Virginia's early polls forecasting the 1936 presidential election 
and the fact that Glass was eventually unopposed for reelection to the senate in 1936. By 
the summer of 1935 it appeared likely that Roosevelt would once again enjoy the support 
of the commonwealth as he had in 1932. Beginning in July 1935, the Richmond Times- 
Dispatch published a serious of straw-poll updates culminating in a three-week tally in 
which Roosevelt had garnered an impressive 84.52 percent of the vote.34 Several months 
later the Times-Dispatch reported the results of a poll taken by the Literary Digest in 
which New Deal policies as a whole were approved in the state by 52.15 percent. 35 
Despite these positive signs, Moore would continue for much of the next year in both 
public and private to help assure not only victory in the commonwealth, but a majority 
for FDR that could be seen as nothing less than a full endorsement of the administration's 
- - 
33 Ronald Heinemann, The Depression and the New Deal in Virginia: The Enduring Dominion 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983), 142. 
34 Richmond Times-Dispatch, August 4, 1935. 
35 Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 6, 1935. 
policies. While Moore hoped that an impressive Roosevelt majority in Virginia migllt 
help elect a more progressive governor in 1937, he had little reason to believe it would 
alter the opposition of Virginia's senators to the New Deal. 
The summer and fall of 1935 also saw the emergence of an openly pro-Roosevelt 
political faction in Virginia of anti-organization Democrats. The "antis" as they were 
sometimes known, included several prominent state politicians such as former governors 
Westnioreland Davis and E. Lee Trinkle, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson, 
Secretary of the State Democratic Committee Martin Hutchinson, Lieutenant Governor 
James H. Price, and newspaper publishers Charles J. Harkrader and Norman Hamilton. 
The group also included two of Virginia's congressmen, John Flannagan and Clifton 
~ o o d r u r n . ~ ~  Moore used his quiet alliance with these men in order to ensure Roosevelt7s 
re-election in 1936. Along with the support of these high-profile politicians came the 
formation of Roosevelt Clubs in the summer of 1935, which this group of "antis" helped 
to organize and support as a means of advocating the president's re-election.37 On July 
22, 1935, Lieutenant Governor Janies H. Price announced his candidacy for the 
Democratic nomination for governor in 1937. The press immediately saw the New Deal 
as likely the main issue in a nomination fight almost two years away.38 In time Price's 
campaign for the governorship and his subsequent administration would serve as the 
backdrop for Moore's efforts to aid anti-organization Democrats in Virginia. For now, 
36 The majority of this list is taken from Heinemam, Depression and New Deal in Virginia, 140. 
37 Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 23, 1935, September 9, 1935. 
38 Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 23, 1935, August 4, 1935. 
Moore concentrated on gathering support for the President's reelection among the state's 
political elite. 
In late September 1935 Senator Byrd finally met with the president at the White 
House. While the senator said nothing publicly about the meeting,39 he presumably let 
FDR know that he would not endorse a third party ticket and would allow for an 
instructed Virginia delegation for the president at the Democratic National Convention in 
Philadelphia the following summer. Byrd's private acquiescence to the president's re- 
nomination left Moore with little to do politically for the remainder of the year. 
The beginning of 1936 saw the first of many election-year conversions by 
organization members to Roosevelt's cause. With the president likely to be re-elected, 
several prominent Virginia Democrats who had spent at least part of the past four years 
opposing his policies were quick to climb aboard the Roosevelt bandwagon. The first 
among these men was Representative Howard W. Smith. Smith, who had opposed 
several recent New Deal measures including Social Security in 1935, praised the 
president at the Democratic Party's annual Jackson Day Dinner in January. In fact, the 
representative from the Eighth District criticized the Supreme Court's recent overturning 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration Act and went so far as to place 
Roosevelt's name along with those of Jefferson and Jackson in the pantheon of great 
Democratic presidents.40 
39 Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 24, 1935. 
40 Bruce J. Dierenfield, Howard W. Smith: Keeper of the Rules (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 1987), 63. 
With Roosevelt facing no opposition within the Democratic Party for the 
nomination, Moore apparently felt he needed to make little effort on the President's 
behalf until the summer's state and national conventions. Meanwhile, National 
Democratic Party Chairman James A. Farley continued gathering forces for Roosevelt in 
Virginia. In March, he wrote to Governor Peery seeking a list of individuals to speak on 
Roosevelt's behalf. Two weeks later Peery replied with a list composed of both anti- 
organization figures such as Price and former governor E. Lee Trinkle and organization 
stalwarts like future governor William T U C ~ . ~ '  
While Peery was certainly a key member of the organization and a Byrd ally, his 
assistance to Farley is not surprising. While disagreeing sharply with the administration 
on issues of policy and governing philosophy, lie was a practical politician and a party 
man. In 1934 he had signed campaign material touting the New Deal's relief efforts and 
despite some criticism even campaigned for anti-organization congressman John 
Flannagan, who both Glass and Byrd disdained.42 
In June, Farley began an endeavor that Moore would lead for the next five 
months: to convince Senator Glass to endorse the President for re-election in a campaign 
speech.43 Farley's June request, like many of Moore's that would follow that summer and 
fall, received no reply. Foreshadowing the 1936 campaign, historian A. Cash Koeniger 
has described the middle course Glass had to take with respect to his own proud record of 
4 1 Farley to Peery, March 9, 1936, Peery to Farley, March 23, 1936, Box 21, Governor George C. Peery 
Executive Papers, Library of Virginia. 
42 Ibid. Peery to Flannagan, September 24, 1934, Flannagan to Peery, October 29, 1934, signed campaign 
material November 7, 1934. 
43 Farley to Glass, June 6, 1936, Correspondence A-J, Glass Papers. 
opposition and the avoidance of any overt opposition to FDR, as one that "would be not 
an easy road to While Glass did attend the 1936 Democratic National 
Convention in Philadelphia, he refused a place on the resolutions committee for the first 
time in twenty years and was replaced on the committee by Governor ~ e e r ~ . ~ ~  The 
message could not have been any clearer to Moore and the administration, Glass might 
go along with the re-nomination but he did not have to be happy about it. 
On July 4, 1936, with the presidential campaign getting into full swing, R. Walton 
Moore accompanied the president and Mrs. Roosevelt, as well as other members of the 
presidential party to   on tic el lo." Senator Glass's speech introducing the president was 
largely devoted to Jefferson, but he did take time to make a couple of favorable 
comparisons of Roosevelt to Jefferson. He finished the speech by saying that it was "with 
infinite pleasure" that he introduced the president.47 Glass's stiff opposition to most of the 
New Deal over the last four years almost certainly would have never have been detected 
from his remarks at Jefferson's home. 
After the president spoke on Jefferson and the ceremony had ended, Moore rode 
with presidential party to Richmond and boarded the presidential yacht the Potomac and 
headed down the James River. Senator Byrd and his wife then came aboard at Upper 
-- - - 
44 A. Cash Koeniger, "The Politics of Independence: Carter Glass and the Elections of 1936" South Atlantic 
Quarterly 80 (Winter 1981), 104. 
45 Richmond News-Leader, June 23, 193 6. 
46 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes Vol. 2 (New York, 1954), 629. 
47 Washington Post, July 5 ,  1936. 
Brandon to join the party for dinner.48 Despite the outward appearance of harmony, 
which Glass's introduction and the Byrds' arrival on board the Potomac suggested, this 
was merely a faqade that owed more to history, than any real political reconciliation. 
What Moore, FDR, Glass, and Byrd did have in common was great esteem for the legacy 
of Thomas Jefferson and the origins of the Democratic Party. In fact it had actually been 
Howard Smith who originally invited the president to speak at Monticello, hoping to use 
Jefferson's status as the founder of the party to convince FDR to make the trip.49 For 
Moore, at the house of one of his heroes, it must have been heart warming to hear even 
mild praise of Roosevelt come from Glass. But his warm feeling would not last long and 
before the summer was over Glass's interpretation of American history would collide 
with Moore's current aims. 
On July 15, 1936, Assistant Secretary of State William Bullitt, who, like Moore, 
shared the title with Sumner Welles and Wilbur Can, made a speech at Randolph Macon 
College in Ashland, at a festival commemorating the bicentennial of Patrick Henry's 
birth. In the speech Bullitt had implied that if Patrick Henry were alive in 1936 he would 
have supported the New Deal. Moore, who was a close fhend of Bullitt and who was 
perhaps more watchful than anyone over Virginia's history thought it was "a good 
address and admirably deli~ered."~' Several days later Senator Glass delivered an address 
at Ashland that his biographer and friend, Rixey Smith, later described as meant to 
48 Ickes, Secret Diary, 629. 
49 Bruce J. Dierenfield, "Congressmen Howard W. Smith," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 
1981), 81. 
50 Moore to Roosevelt, July 3 1, 1936, R. Walton Moore file 1934-1936, Box 75, PSF. 
"correct inaccuracies in Bullitt's speech."51 But the actual speech was perceived as going 
far beyond any mere corrections. In fact, major newspapers across the country 
highlighted the speech and once again speculated that Glass might bolt the Democratic 
Glass defended his speech at Ashland both in private and in public saying that it 
had not been an attack on Roosevelt. Responding to an editorial in Charles Harkrader's 
Bristol Herald Courier, Glass wrote that the idea that his Ashland speech was a 
denunciation of the president was "totally without truth." He explained that he had 
spoken out because Bullitt had used "the name and fame of Patrick Henry" for political 
purposes. 53 
After acknowledging Glass's explanation of his remarks in his reply, Harkader 
joined the growing chorus of Roosevelt supporters, lead by Moore, who felt Glass "could 
render the party a most valuable service by making some speeches during the 
campaign."54 Just as in dealing with Farley before, Glass did not acknowledge 
Harkrader's request in his reply to his letter.55 
Moore felt Glass's remarks "a fool speech which had furnished ammunition to the 
enemy" in the campaign. The speech seemed to mark a turning point in his personal view 
of Glass. He now described him to Roosevelt as a "thoroughly egotistical and garrulous 
5 1  Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass: A Biography (New York: Longmans, 1939), 387 
52 New York Times, July 18, 1936 
53 Glass to Harkader, August 3, 1936, Harkrader Papers. 
54 Harkrader to Glass, August 8, 1936, Harkrader Papers. 
55 Glass to Harkrader, August 10, 1936, Harkrader Papers. 
old man, who does not deserve to be taken seriously."56 A week later Moore privately 
derided Glass as "mentally ~nbalanced."~' 
Roosevelt shared with Moore liis annoyance of over Glass's speech at Ashland 
and the senator's general reluctance to aid his campaign. In a memo to Moore, the 
president commented if "Carter wants to do the right thing he will make a radio address, 
as in the 1932 campaign, but I would not want it done unless I could approve it first. One 
foolish statement might destroy the good effect of all the rest of itv5* Despite his 
displeasure with Glass over the speech, he continued to seek the aid of Virginia's senior 
senator both personally and through Moore. 
On August 25, 1936, Glass met with the president at the White House. In a press 
conference afterwards the president denied any discussion about Glass making a 
campaign speech.59 The idea that the topic did not come up in the meeting between the 
two seems highly unlikely for two reasons. First, Roosevelt had Moore and others 
entreating Glass to make a campaign speech for the next month. Second, Glass quickly 
endorsed Roosevelt again publicly after the meeting despite his reluctance to make a 
speech on his behalf.60 Insight into Glass's pessimistic view of the 1936 presidential 
election can be found in an editorial by his newspaper, the Lynchburg News. The editorial 
56 Moore to Roosevelt, July 31, 1936, PSF Box 75, R. Walton Moore file, 1934-1936. 
57 Moore to Alexander Sands, August 6, 1936, Box 17, Moore Papers. Sands was a strong supporter of the 
president from Richmond with whom Moore occasionally consulted on Virginia politics. 
58 Roosevelt to Moore, August 10, 1936. Moore Papers. Published in ed. Elliot Roosevelt FDR: His 
Personal Letters, 1928-1945, Vol. 3 (New York 1947-1950), 607. 
59 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Conferences (New York: De Capo Press ) 1972, VIII, 96-97. 
60 FDR: His Personal Letters, 1928-1 945, 607. 
proclaimed that Glass's support of Roosevelt was simple because "to him Democrats at 
their worst are better than Republicans at their best."61 
A week later, Moore resumed his pressure on Glass to make a campaign speech 
for the president. "Without being prompted by anyone to do so," he told Glass, "I think a 
speech by you, and better at this time than later would be of great assistance to the 
administration." Flattering Glass, he continued, "The opposition has made a great use of 
your recent comments on the New Deal, because of the weight that attaches to any 
opinion you express."62 The idea that Glass's anti-New Deal statements would help the 
opposition is something that was a consistent theme for Moore. Moore's correspondence 
continually makes allusions to Republican utilization of Glass's anti-New Deal comments 
and their potential effect on the outcome of the election." This factor, more than any 
other, seems to have been Moore's primary motive to continue to push for a radio address 
by Glass. 
Over the next several weeks Moore continued his quest to have Glass speak, but 
heard little from the senator himself. Moore did get in touch with Glass's secretary only 
to be told to hold off contacting Glass until Cary Grayson could speak with him, which 
6 1 Lynchburg News, September 6, 1936. 
62 Moore to Glass, September 2, 1936, Box 6, Moore Papers. Letter also quoted in Koeniger, "The Politics 
of Independence," 103. 
63 Moore to Sands, August 6, 1936, Moore to Roosevelt, September 7, 1936, Moore to FDR, September 
22, 1936, Moore Papers. Moore to Roosevelt, September 19, 1936, Box 75, PSF. 
Moore agreed to do." Grayson was a "close friend" of Glass who had served as the 
personal physician to several presidents, most recently Woodrow ~ i l s o n . ~ ~  
While Moore struggled to get Glass involved in the campaign, other members of 
the organization were proving a little more helpful in making the president's case around 
the commonwealth. When Moore wrote Peery complaining about his perceived lack of 
involvement in the presidential campaign, Peery strongly rebutted Moore's suggestion 
writing "I am not indifferent to the result of the election in Virginia. I very much desire 
the reelection of the President." He continued by promising to make future speeches, 
which he did.66 In the coming weeks Peery spoke across the state "selectively praising 
Roosevelt's banking and farm policies."67 Peery had also written to Moore noting the 
presence of a breakaway political faction known as the Jeffersonian Democrats, who he 
believed would "stir up our workers so that we will get a larger Democratic majority than 
The Jeffersonian Democrats were a fringe group of anti-Roosevelt Democrats 
who attracted little support even among the President's detractors in the commonwealth. 
Moore was certainly aware of the group, but paid it little mind throughout the campaign, 
focusing most of his efforts on Glass and Byrd. 
In addition to Governor Peery, Senator Byrd also joined in the campaign in 
October, making a radio address and later speaking in Lynchburg and Staunton. Byrd 
64 Moore to Roosevelt, September 19, 1936. Ibid. 
65 Smith and Beasley, Carter Glass,, 228. 
66 Peery to Moore, September 5, 1936. Box 30, Peery Executive Papers. 
67 Fry, Joseph A. "George Campbell Peery: Conservative Son of Old Virginia," (M.A.Thesis, University of 
Virginia, 1970). 
Peery to Moore, September 26, 1936, Box 30, Peery Executive Papers. 
mustered what praise he could for Roosevelt, citing the New Deal bills he had supported 
and defending his opposition to those measures he did not favor. His most lavish praise 
for Roosevelt was given in generalities, the senator exclaiming "In those the dark days of 
1933.. ..He met the crisis with a calm courage that won the applause of the nation and 
restored conf iden~e."~~ While faintly praising Roosevelt, Byrd was also sure to defend his 
own record of opposition to a number of New Deal measures.70 
While neither Peery's nor Byrd's speeches could be called overwhelming in their 
support of the President, the fact that they occurred showed their support for the party's 
ticket and that they were not indifferent to the outcome of the election in Virginia. When 
Moore mentioned to Roosevelt the lackluster and belated campaign effort of organization 
members, he was also quick to assert that it did not bother him too much because "antis" 
such as Price, Woodrum, and Trinkle "were exerting themselves to the ~tmost ."~'  The 
significance of this statement should not be overlooked. Here, Moore is telling the 
President three weeks before the election that his victory in Virginia will be owed in 
much larger part to the efforts of anti-organization Democrats in the state. 
The same week that Moore noted the division of political labor in Virginia, there 
began a brief debate within the administration about the effectiveness of Moore's efforts 
to encourage Senator Glass to speak. A memo to the president from Stephen Early, one of 
his private secretaries, detailed Early's phone conversation with Cary Grayson. Grayson 
told Early that Glass's wife was seriously ill and that Moore, Jesse Jones, and others 
69 Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 14, 1936. 
70 Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia, 176- 177. 
7 1 Moore to Roosevelt, October 7, 1936, Box 17, Moore Papers. 
pushing the senator to make a campaign speech should "lay off." Early's memo to FDR 
said there are only four men the senator "likes and will listen to. They are yourself, Jim 
Farley, Cary and me. Others only muddy the waters."72 Moore's absence from the list is 
conspicuous given how long he and Glass had known and presumably liked each other. 
Part of the reason for this exclusion is detailed later in the memo. Apparently, "one of 
Walton Moore's sisters made the statement that the Senator was in his dotage. This 
statement has reached him and there is decided bad feeling on that score."73 Given 
Moore's previous correspondence regarding Glass's age and mental health it is 
reasonable to assume his sister's comments most likely originated from him. For all 
practical purposes this event ended the polite correspondence and formal relationship 
between Moore and Glass. From this point onward their relationship became increasingly 
adversarial, and their private correspondence was also decidedly more negative about 
each other. 
Several days after receiving Early's memo, Roosevelt wrote to Moore and 
reiterated Grayson's suggestion that Moore "lay off' Glass for awhile.74 Moore's reply to 
the president suggests that Grayson was gullible to believe Glass about his wife's health. 
Drawing on his long relationship with Glass, Moore said that the senator often used his 
own health or that of a relative to make excuses.75 Despite his protestations, Moore 
72 Early to Roosevelt, October 2, 1936, R. Walton Moore 1934-1936 file, Box 75, PSF. Jesse Jones worked 
in the Roosevelt Administration as Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at this time. 
73 Ibid. "Dotage" means advanced age or declining years. 
74 Roosevelt to Moore, October 6, 1936, Moore Papers. 
75 Moore to Roosevelt, October 12, 1936. 
certainly adhered to the president's instructions and did not attempt to contact Glass for 
the remainder of the campaign. 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1936 what Moore and others in the 
administration probably did not realize was Glass's rationale for not wanting to make a 
campaign speech. Not only did Glass oppose most New Deal legislation on practical 
grounds, deeming some of it unconstitutional, but more importantly he felt betrayed. The 
source of this betrayal was the result of the 1932 campaign when Glass had a made 
speech castigating Hoover on Roosevelt's behalf. Yet Glass felt Roosevelt once in office 
had "repudiated every word of it," making him feel "ashamed for having made the 
speech. He [Roosevelt] has done everything and more, for which I literally flayed 
,376 Hoover.. . According to Glass, he ma.de the president aware of his rationale, but it is 
clear the message was never communicated to Moore or anyone else in the Democratic 
Party. Despite the efforts of Roosevelt, Moore, and a host of others, Glass had confided 
to Byrd on October 5th that "I hate the New Deal just as much as I ever did and have not 
the remotest idea of making any speeches for it."77 
Moore's efforts to convince Glass to speak for Roosevelt were completely 
misguided. It is evident from Glass's correspondence that Moore did not accurately 
conceive of the depth of Glass's genuine opposition. The day after Glass's comments to 
Byrd, the senior senator unleashed a written tirade against Moore and others in the 
administration who sought his assistance, writing to friend, "I opposed the New Deal in 
76 Glass to Tydings, October 9, 1936, Glass Papers. 
77 Glass to Byrd, October 5, 1936, Box 139, Hany F. Byrd Papers, University of Virginia Library. Letter 
quoted in Heinemann, Depression and New Deal in Virginia, 143. 
the Senate, nearly every measure of which has since been declared unconstitutional, and I 
have not the slightest idea of going on the stump, even if I were physically strong enough, 
to advocate things against which I spoke and voted and which I very much fear are going 
to wreck the country. I intend to preserve my party regularity by supporting the nominees 
of the party at the election, since I have never in my life scratched a Democratic ballot; 
but that's 
With his efforts to convince Glass to make a campaign speech cut off by FDR, 
Moore turned to what he himself could do to aid the President's reelection. On October 
14, 1936, Moore drove to Richmond to deliver a radio address endorsing Roosevelt's re- 
election. The address was simple and to the point, drawing numerous historical references 
and sharp comparisons to the Republican ticket. In it he compared current conditions to 
those that existed in 1932, noting improvements in "industry, agriculture, with respect to 
labor, in foreign trade and every other direction." Moore went on to tout the "relief of 
agriculture and old age pensions." He also went on the attack, describing a recent 
statement by Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Frank Knox that the banks were 
unsafe, as "criminal." Moore closed by invoking the history of his beloved 
commonwealth proclaiming "like some immortal Virginians of old days, the President 
comes within the only reliable definition of greatness.. ..The President is great because in 
truth he is a President of all the people."79 
'' Glass to R.L. Ailworth, October 6, 1936, Glass Papers, Box 380. 
79 R. Walton Moore Campaign Speech, October 14, 1936, R. Walton Moore Vertical File, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. 
The press comment on the speech focused primarily on Moore's rebuttal of 
Republican charges that the New Deal was not responsible the country's economic 
recovery since 1933. He debunked these charges by noting that the GOP had been 
unwilling to re-nominate Herbert Hoover to test their theory. Moore's disdain for 
Hoover's leadership did not pass with time. Three years later he still believed the fom~er 
President "shortsighted, and that if he and his tribe had remained in control of the 
government there might have been a revolution.. . . 9 '80 
The fact that Moore injected himself personally into the campaign at this stage is 
indeed noteworthy. It marks the only time in his service in the State Depa.rtment that he 
made any political speech or provided any extensive public commentary meant to 
influence domestic politics or policy. The speech clearly shows the enormous importance 
Moore placed on securing a substantial majority for Roosevelt in Virginia. 
Asked by a member of the press to give his forecast of the election, Moore 
summarized his views succinctly, discounting more extreme elements in the election such 
as the Jeffersonian Democrats and Liberty Leaguers and basing his prediction of 
Roosevelt's victory on "the common sense of the American people." In listing his reasons 
that this common sense among the electorate would prevail Moore cited a reluctance to 
return to the "reactionary spirit" of the Hoover years, the economic recovery "which we 
feel.. .will soon be complete'' and the desire for government to be conducted "in the 
liberal spirit according to Mr. Jefferson's fundamental conception."81 Moore's election 
80 Moore Autobiography, p. 103, Box 2, Gellman Papers. 
8 1  Moore 1936 election statement, undated, Box 11, Moore Papers. 
statement perhaps tells more about his views than the election itself. Opposing extremes 
on either side, he had sought a progressive middle ground, which he felt Roosevelt 
embodied. In doing so he had drawn upon not only Jefferson, but fellow Virginian 
Woodrow Wilson for confirmation of his current political views.82 
On November 4, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt was resoundingly reelected to the 
presidency by one of the largest margins in American history, winning the electoral votes 
of all but two states. The outcome was also overwhelming in Virginia, where Roosevelt 
received 70 percent of the popular vote, the largest majority in the commonwealth's 
history.83 This outcome which gave the president a more than 100,000-vote majority in 
the commonwealth greatly outstripped the estimates Moore had been receiving from 
Richmond of a 60,000-vote majority.84 Glass, who had steadfastly refused to speak for 
Roosevelt was also re-elected by a huge margin garnering 91.7 percent of the vote.85 
Virginia's support of Roosevelt in the 1936 election was of course no surprise 
given the commonwealth's staunchly Democratic history and organization control. While 
Moore labored in the year preceding the election in order to align Virginia's political elite 
in Roosevelt's column he never really doubted that Roosevelt would carry the Old 
Dominion. Moore could take solace in the large majority the president enjoyed in 
82 Ibid. 
83 Hunter, "Carter Glass, Harry Byrd and the New Deal, 1932-1936," p. 102. Washington Post, November 
5 ,  1936. 
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85 Ralph Eisenberg, Virginia Votes, 1924-1968 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 197 l), 23. 
Virginia despite the perpetual criticism of its two most powerful figures, Byrd and 
especially Glass. 
This majority also gave Moore the confidence to become more assertive on behalf 
of anti-organization Democrats. Like the "antis," in the aftermath of the 1936 race he was 
no longer willing to accept organization control of all facets of Virginia's government. 
Given the commonwealth's endorsement of the president and his policies, Moore now 
sought to help secure support for those Virginians seeking a small New Deal of their 
own. Having helped in his own way to ensure a victory for Roosevelt in Virginia, he now 
made the cause of anti-organization Democrats his own. Moore's remarks to Roosevelt 
regarding the lackluster efforts of organization members were the beginning of this effort. 
The extent to which Roosevelt would also adopt their cause over the next two years 
would ultimately determine whether Virginia would adopt reforms similar to the New 
Deal or largely maintain the status quo. 
Chapter I1 
1936- 1939: Aiding the 'Antis' 
The enormity of Franklin Roosevelt's re-election victory in Virginia emboldened 
R. Walton Moore to assert himself more actively on behalf of the anti-organization 
faction of the Virginia Democratic Party. Over the next three years, Moore served 
primarily as tlie chief liaison between the president and a number of 'antis,' most 
importantly soon-to-be Governor James H. Price. Moore's actions during this period 
were focused on influencing the allocation of federal patronage in Virginia. The rationale 
he used to encourage Roosevelt to aid the "antis" through patronage was to remind to him 
that failure to do so could lead to a conservative Virginia delegation being sent to the 
Democratic National Convention in 1 9 4 0 . ~ ~  Presumably, such a delegation would join 
with other southern conservatives to block the re-nomination of FDR or any other 
candidate advocating the continuation of the New Deal. While Moore would increasingly 
labor to help the 'antis' wrestle control of federal patronage from the Byrd organization, 
as time and circun~stance would show, his ultimate loyalty lay with Roosevelt. 
In the immediate aftermath of the presidential election, Moore had little 
involvement in Virginia politics. This is due in part to the fact he was appointed acting 
Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on Noveniber 6, 1936, and would remain in the 
post for the next couple months while Secretary of State Cordell Hull was attending the 
86 Moore to Price, July 3 1, 1938, Price file, Box 16, Moore Papers. Letter quoted in A. Cash Koeniger, 
"The New Deal and the States: Roosevelt Versus the Byrd Organizatioil in Virginia," The Journal of 
American History 68 (March 1982), 889. Also see Moore to Price, October 15, 1938, Price file, box, 16, 
Moore Papers. 
Inter-American Conference at Buenos ~ i r e s . ~ ~  It was not until the end of the year that 
Moore's political activities on behalf of the 'antis' began again. 
Meanwhile other developments had already begun to shape the nature of 
Virginia's political scene for 1937. On December 22, 1936, Lieutenant Governor Price, a 
declared candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor and the overwhelming 
favorite, issued an open letter to two Richmond Democrats that essentially "removed all 
doubts of his conservatism in economic matters." The open letter echoed, just enough, the 
conservative economic philosophy for which Senator Byrd was so well known. The 
publication of the letter quickly led to the endorsement of an avalanche of organization 
officials. Although Byrd did not formally endorse Price, he issued a statement that 
implied he would not oppose him and praised him in general terms.88 Moore had 
followed the development of the early stages of the governor's race in Virginia closely, 
asking Price a year before "whether Representative Bmch," Byrd's preferred candidate, 
would oppose him. A week after the endorsements began, Rep. Thomas Burch, to whom 
Moore had referred the previous year, dropped out of the gubernatorial race.89 
While Byrd may have been forced by Price's statement to acquiesce to the latter's 
ascension to the governor's mansion, he did not relent. Byrd quickly resumed his role as 
administration critic in January 1937 by informing Roosevelt that he would not support 
87 Executive Order, November 6, 1936, Box 11, Moore Papers. Draft of Statement on Appointment, Box 
10, Ibid. 
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the president's first major initiative of the New Year, the Executive Reorganization bill.90 
In fact, his opposition "played a decisive role in the eventual defeat of the Byrd's 
opposition to the measure, which lasted for more than a year, further widened .the gap 
between organization leaders and the administration. 
R. Walton Moore, noting this quick succession of events around Christmas that 
virtually assured a Price victory, wrote the lieutenant governor "very confidentially" that 
he would be invited to a luncheon at the White House in the next few weeks.92 The 
reason for the confidentiality Moore invoked had to do with the delicate state of Virginia 
politics. Throughout his first term and through 1937, Roosevelt did not want to be seen as 
openly aiding the 'antis.' This is one of the reasons he had denied any connections to 
Norman Hamilton's criticism of Glass in 1935.While he was certainly in favor of a more 
progressive state government for Virginia along the lines of the New Deal, he did not 
want to incite even greater opposition from Glass, and especially Byrd. It had been 
Moore's belief that Glass "rarely concerns himself about appointments." The patronage 
strategy Moore initiated is seen through his recommendation of a Virginia judgeship 
candidate to FDR in 1935. Moore wrote, "I hope for the appointment of some liberal- 
minded, high class lawyer to whom Senator Byrd could find no ground for objection, but 
who nevertheless would not represent his choice."93 
90 Byrd to Roosevelt, January 13, 1937, Box 7, official file 285C, Roosevelt Papers. 
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When potential problems arose over appointments, the president normally 
deferred to Byrd and   lass.^^ This strategy would largely remain in place until the 
summer of 1938 when Roosevelt, hstrated with Byrd, Glass and other conservative 
Democrats, publicly challenged their control over Virginia's patronage. But until then, 
Moore continued to aid the "antis" in private without antagonizing the organization. He 
had conducted a similar balancing act in advocating Roosevelt's re-election in 1936. He 
admonished one political supporter that, "Care should be taken, however, not to conduct 
the work so as to make the lines so definite between the pro-Roosevelt Democrats and the 
,995 facing-both-ways Democrats.. . The key for Moore was to encourage and aid the 
"antis" without drawing too much of the organization's attention, until the President was 
willing to openly to take up their cause. 
Before a meeting that Moore had arranged between Price and Roosevelt could 
take place, another controversy erupted over Roosevelt's plan to expand the number of 
justices on the Supreme Court. This "court packing" plan set the retirement age for 
justices at age seventy and would have added a justice for every one on the present court 
who were over seventy and refused to retire. The effect of this legislation would have 
been to add six new Roosevelt justices to the high court. The plan presented to Congress 
in February 1937 was not shared with legislators until shortly before hand because 
Roosevelt feared it would be leaked to the press if he disclosed its existence.96 At the 
brief meeting prior to the public announcement, Roosevelt "solicited no opinions from 
94 Koeniger, "The New Deal and the States: Roosevelt Versus the Byrd Organization," 881. 
95 Moore to Sands, August 6, 1936, Box 17, Moore Papers. 
96 James A. Farley, Jim Farley S Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), 73. 
his party's leadership" and "presided like an impresario."97 The president's failure to feel 
out Congress cost him in terms of political support especially in Virginia. Both of 
Virginia's senators opposed the plan, with Glass doing so immediately in 
Further, the plan helped to solidify a coalition of Republicans and conservative 
Democrats who would continue to obstruct Roosevelt's domestic program for the next 
two years.99 
Six weeks later, Virginia's senior senator made a national radio address in which 
he derided Roosevelt's "court packing" plan proclaiming that "We would be better to 
abolish the Supreme Court and, by regular process, do away outright with the 
Constitution if they are to be made the playthings of politicians."100 Senator Byrd initially 
remained silent about the plan, but by mid-summer he was predicting the certain defeat of 
the court bill.''' While some 'antis,' such as Congressmen John Flannagan and Clifton 
Woodrum spoke up in support of Roosevelt's plan, the overwhelming sentiment in 
Virginia and that of the nation was with ~ 1 a s s . l ' ~  
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Reflecting on the controversy over two years later Moore dictated the following 
recollection and analysis to his secretary: 
"Incidentally, I may say that before the President's court plan was promulgated, I 
said to the President that in my opinion the court would be inclined to follow the 
elections, Mr. Rooosevelt had just been reelected.. .and with his approval I had a long 
talk with the Chief Justice, which I reported to the President, and if the latter had then 
taken my advice and himself talked with Hughes, he would have found that the court was 
about to become very liberal, and consequently I feel that the court plan never would 
have been an issue and a tremendous controversy would have been avoided."lo3 
While Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's Autobiographical Notes makes no 
mention of a meeting with Moore, he did defend the court against the assertion that it 
reversed itself on several cases dealing with New Deal measures as a result of 
Roosevelt7s plan. Hughes's notation that the court's change of heart on two of the cases 
began before the court plan was announced meshes with Moore's recollection.104 In 
addition to Moore's recollection of being told of the high court's imminent political shift 
to the left, there may have been other historical considerations at the time. Moore's 
penchant for justifying Roosevelt's actions and most New Deal policies in historical 
terms may have been shaken on this occasion. It is inconceivable that Moore, a lifelong 
lawyer, would not have had a definite opinion of the plan. Despite this likelihood, his 
correspondence at the time contains no reference to the plan. Given his affinity for and 
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knowledge of American history it is more likely that he quietly concurred with Glass's 
historical assessment of the plan. This historical assessment of the plan, was best 
summarized by one student of Virginia's opposition to the court plan who believed: 
"The parallel between the action contemplated by President Roosevelt and the 
relations of Washington and Jefferson with the court was meager. Washington had picked 
an entire court, and had yet taken pains to see that his choice was guided by statesmanlike 
considerations, rather than by the demands of expediency. Jefferson likewise had had it 
within his power to pack the Court and had 
For Moore, the historical considerations of the "court packing" plan were by no 
means trivial. He prided himself not only on his ancestry, but also his knowledge of 
Virginia and U.S. history. It had been the guide for his own political life, which he felt 
embodied the Revolutionary-era ideal that men do not seek office, but are called to it by 
their constituents. This is evident in Moore's description of how he came to occupy 
virtually every office he held from the Virginia State Senate to the State ~ e ~ a r t m e n t . ' O ~  
Equally important is the underlying meaning of this recollection with its implied criticism 
of the president. This instance marks the only time that he recorded criticism of FDR. 
In the midst of the public uproar over the president's "court packing" plan 
Lieutenant Governor Price met with Moore and the president for a luncheon at the White 
House. While it is unknown what transpired at the meeting, the Virginia press noted the 
absence of Virginia's Senators and described it "as an event that [might] have profound 
105 Cochran, Robert T., Jr. "Virginia's Opposition to the New Deal, 1933-1940." (M.A. Thesis, Georgetown 
University, 1950), 53. 
'06 Memorandum on Moore's professional life, October 1 1, 1935, Box 1 1, Moore Papers. 
political consequences in virginia."'07 The meeting, which Moore helped to arrange, was 
clearly a nod of political recognition from President Roosevelt to candidate Price. 
A month later Roosevelt meet with another "anti", the congressman from the 
Second District, Norman Hamilton. Hamilton's victory over organization stalwart 
Congressman Colgate Darden in the August 1936 Democratic primary was seen by 
newspaper publisher and anti-organization leader Charles Harkader as evidence of 
Virginia's strong support of the New Deal. Within the year Hamilton would be pressuring 
the White House for greater patronage cornrnitment~.'~~ This trend would continue 
throughout Hamilton's single term in the House of Representatives. 
At the end of April, Roosevelt also met with Harkrader, now a state senator, at 
the White House. Harkrader, "one of Price's most avid supporters," met with FDR to talk 
Virginia politics and no doubt also solicit future patronage  commitment^.'^^ The meeting 
alarmed Senator Byrd who immediately reported it to Glass, writing that Roosevelt "is 
actively supporting in Virginia all the forces hostile to us." In the letter he also implied 
that Moore's support of the 'anti' candidate for lieutenant governor, Robert Daniel, of 
Hopewell, had influenced Price's decision to endorse Daniel after reportedly privately 
'07 Richmond News-Leader, February 28, 1937. Roosevelt said little about the meeting simply commenting 
that they "Just had a nice visit." Transcript of Press Conference #349, March 2, 1937, in Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Papers. 
108 Harkader to Roosevelt, August 5, 1936, OF 300, Roosevelt Papers. Hamilton to McIntyre, September 6, 
1937, OF 4400, Roosevelt Papers, Hamilton to McIntyre, December 3 1, 1937, OF 400 Virginia Treasury, 
ibid. 
'09 Marvin McIntyre to Charles Harkrader, April 27, 1937, Harkrader Papers. Hall, "James H. Price," 148. 
supporting the organization's candidate for lieutenant governor, Saxon ~ o l t . '  lo Price's 
biographer, Alvin Hall, contends that his subject's remarks at Hopewell, which were 
interpreted by some (like Glass) as an endorsement of Daniel, were "meant to be no more 
than a compliment of Daniel before a hometown crowd." Further, one student of the 
Virginia campaigns for governor, lieutenant governor and attorney general emphasized 
that in the latter two, which Price was not personally involved, he "consistently 
maintained.. . benign neutrality.""' The historical record vindicates these interpretations, 
but at the time organization leaders began to feel alarm over what they felt was a subtle 
endorsement by Price of another anti-organization candidate. 
A week later Glass replied to Byrd's alarming note with a written tirade of his 
own that denounced Harkrader as "doing everything he possibly can,. . .to undermine the 
organization in Virginia and do you and me all the harm he can in conjunction with 
Hamilton and Flannagan." Glass then went on to assail both Price and Moore. He agreed 
with Byrd that "Price has little capability.""2 This assessment is contrary to the support 
lie had conveyed for Price in a letter to Harkrader the year before, an indication of his 
growing suspicion of the all the 'antis' and their dealings with the president.'13 Moore, 
Glass's acquaintance of more than thirty-five years, was derided by the senator as 
l  l o  Byrd to Glass, April 29, 1937, Glass Papers. Letter is also quoted in Heinemann, Harry Byrd of 
Virginia, 190 and in Koeniger, "The New Deal and the States," 882. Moore endorsed Robert Daniel for 
Lieutenant Governor, a longtime friend from the Virginia Board of Education, the previous December. 
Richmond News-Leader, December 14, 1936. 
I" Hall, "Price and Virginia Politics," 138. Carl J. Vipperman, "The Coattail Campaign: James H. Price 
and the Election of 1937 in Virginia," Annual Collections of Essays in History, 8 (1962-1963), 58. 
112 Glass to Byrd, May 3, 1937, Box 345, Glass Papers. Letter also quoted in Koeniger, "The New Deal and 
the States," 882. 
113 Glass to Harkrader, August 10, 1936, Harkrader Papers. 
"unstable as water and, being on the federal pay list, he may be expected to do us any 
harm he can." Glass's harsh denunciation of Moore is not surprising given the negative 
comments from Moore's sister that had reached him the previous year and the obvious 
challenge to his power he felt Moore and the 'antis' presented. In addition to political 
challenges and personal snipes, Glass was also undoubtedly suffering emotionally from 
the illness of his wife, who died a month later.'I4 
The senator's shift into an even more vigorous opponent of the administration in 
the aftermath of the court fight and his realization of the emerging alliance between 
Roosevelt and the 'antis' is important to note. For the remainder of Roosevelt's second 
term, it was Glass, more than any other member of the organization, whom Moore would 
have to outmaneuver in order to aid the 'antis,' if there was to be any hope of altering the 
organization's political dominance of Virginia. 
On May 21, 1937, R. Walton Moore was appointed as the Counselor in the State 
Department, the position he would hold until his resignation in 1941."~ Moore was 
passed over by FDR for the higher position of Under Secretary of State in favor of 
another Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. This happened despite Cordell 
Hull's support of Moore's candidacy for the position."6 In terms of his involvement with 
Virginia politics, Moore's title change is noteworthy because it did not diminish his 
political efforts. Perhaps more importantly, despite being passed over the Under 
-- - - 
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Secretary's position by FDR, he continued to remain loyal to the president. While 
speculation over Moore's health and possible retirement began as early as the summer of 
1937, the 78-year-old apparently took little notice of it, remaining content to serve out the 
remainder of Roosevelt's second term. 117 
Several months after Moore received his new title to no one's surprise, Lieutenant 
Governor Price won the Virginia Democratic gubernatorial primary over State Delegate 
Vivian Page in overwhelming fashion. The general election that followed in November 
proved to be a mere formality in staunchly Democratic Virginia, with Price easily 
defeating Republican J. Powell ~ o ~ a 1 . l ' ~  While Moore was certainly an ally of Price, the 
lieutenant governor's personal popularity and the acquiescence of the organization's 
leaders in December 1936 to his nomination, had all but assured his victory. With victory 
nearly certain, Moore took no active role in the campaign and instead focused on building 
alliances between anti-organization leaders and the White House throughout 1937. 
Moore did not attend the new governor's inauguration in January 1938, but the 
administration was represented by Roosevelt's military aide, Virginian Colonel Edwin M. 
Watson, and Secretary of Agriculture Henry wallace.' l 9  As previously noted, Moore's 
involvement in Virginia politics did not extend to specific policy initiatives at the state 
level. 
117 Adolf A. Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: from the papers of AdolfA. Berle, eds. Beatrice 
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What little iiivolvement that did come from the Roosevelt Administration in terms of 
state policy came from the president himself. For example on March 1, 1938, Roosevelt 
wrote Price urging that he push the General Assembly to enact a "low-rent housing and 
slum clearance program" in Virginia. Federal legislation passed the previous year had 
made loans and subsidies available for this type of con~tx-uction.'~~ Price quickly lobbied 
the House Finance Committee where the bill had been stuck. The bill was soon voted out 
of committee and passed by the whole house. Next, the new governor sent a personal 
message to the state senate urging the law's enactment. The measure was quickly passed 
by the upper house.l2l The slum clearance act was but one of several pieces of 
moderately progressive legislation, including minor reforms in education and passage of 
an "Old Age Pension Act" that Price was able to get the legislature to pass in 1938 as 
Virginia briefly enacted its own "little New ~ e a l . " ' ~ ~  
While the President was no doubt pleased with Price's early legislative successes, 
he could claim few of his own thus far in his second term. Upset over congressional 
defeats in 1937-1938 over the court plan, executive reorganization, and the wages-and- 
hours bills, President Roosevelt set out to "purge" certain Democrats who had 
consistently opposed these and other New Deal measures by opposing them in party 
primaries in 1938. Neither of Virginia's senators, both strong critics of the New Deal, 
was up for re-election in 1938. In time Roosevelt would challenge them on another front. 
120 Roosevelt to Price, March 1, 1938, James H. Price Papers, Washington & Lee University, Lexington, 
Virginia. 
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For now, Congressman Howard W. Sniith, who sat on the House Rules Committee, was 
the only Virginian the administration tried to "purge." Earlier in the year his committee 
had defeated the administration's wages-and-hours bill. The administration believed the 
defeat of Smith and two other committee members, John J. O'Connor, of New York, and 
committee chairman Edward E. Cox, of Georgia, would "have a very salutary effect in 
the House" by giving the administration greater "control of the Rules ~ommi t t e e . " ' ~~  
Moore's involvement in this aspect of the "purge" is difficult to discern, but from 
all indications he took no active role in trying to unseat Smith. Two factors lead to this 
conclusion. First, while Moore resented Smith for announcing his congressional 
candidacy early in 193 1 before it was entirely clear that the former would retire,'24 he 
understood that Smith had the organization's support and thus he would be difficult to 
defeat in 1938 irregardless of who the administration supported. Second, as both Moore 
and Smith noted, Smith's opponent, academic William E. Dodd Jr., son of the former 
ambassador to Germany, "had been an infrequent resident" of Virginia because of his 
extensive schooling at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, and the University 
of ~ e r 1 i n . l ~ ~  Moore, who had lived in Fairfax his entire life and represented the district in 
Congress, no doubt felt that Dodd was a bit of an interloper. This was Moore's political 
123 Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, Vol. 2 ,4  16. 
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reality despite his close friendship with the former ambassador with whom he 
corresponded regularly. 
From the beginning of the campaign Dodd sought to portray himself as the 
favored choice of the president. This desire was furthered by a newspaper report printed 
June 24, 1938, that discussed Dodd "leaving the White House after a high level political 
conference." While Roosevelt met with Dodd, he never did formally endorse his 
candidacy. Roosevelt's reluctance to back Dodd did not deter Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes. Ickes injected himself into the campaign on Dodd's behalf by criticizing 
Smith's opposition to the Public Works Administration. The secretary's comments seem 
to have hurt Dodd more than they helped him, by arousing negative press commentary 
around the state about federal interference in local e1ecti0ns.l~~ Both Moore and the 
president may have stayed out of the race after seeing Governor Price's refusal to endorse 
Dodd's candidacy and hearing his intimation to James A. Farley that "Dodd hadn't a 
prayer."'27 Price's assessment proved to be correct when on August 2 ,  1938 Smith 
defeated Dodd by 19,734 to 6,555. 
Overall the entire "purge" was almost a complete failure. It registered as its only 
victim Congressman John O'Connor, who was from Roosevelt's home state of New 
York. The recognition of its failure has been so frequently noted by scholars and the 
public that Roosevelt's "use of primary endorsements has never been attempted by any 
Ibid.,198, 213. 
127 Fatley, Jim Farley 's Story, 139. Hall "Price and Virginia Politics," 210. 
succeeding president."'28 While Roosevelt had refused a formal primary endorsement of 
Dodd, the administration's involvement in the contest was apparent and so it was still 
saddled with his losing effort. In the aftermath of the election, the President did not want 
to dwell on the failure of his "purge" and resisted attempts by Dodd's father, the former 
ambassador to Germany, to meet for a discussion of Virginia's political ~ i t ua t i 0n . l~~  
Roosevelt biographer James MacGregor Bums's keen analysis of the overall 
"purge" attempts aptly described the administration's efforts as "hurried, inadequate and 
amateurish maneuvers at the last minute." In fact, his feeling that "in some states the 
White House interfered just enough to antagonize the opponent, but not enough to ensure 
his defeat"130 could easily apply to Virginia. While Dodd may have at best been a long 
shot, Ickes's entrance into the race certainly served to "antagonize" Smith and galvanize 
his supporters. 
In addition to Dodd's huge loss, 'anti' Congressman Norman Hamilton, of the 
Second District, lost a close primary race to former Congressman Colgate Darden, whom 
he had defeated two years earlier. The Hamilton campaign had contacted the White 
House during the final stages of the race seeking an endorsement from Roosevelt, but 
none was forthcoming. While Roosevelt may have wished to limit his personal 
involvement in Virginia congressional primaries, it probably did not help Hamilton that 
some of the President's closest aides had become annoyed with the congressman's 
128 Charles M. Pierce and Joseph Boskin, "The Roosevelt 'Purge': A Reappraisal," The Journal of Politics 
28 no. 3 (August 1966): 662. 
12' Robert Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat: The Life of William E. Dodd (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), 326. 
130 Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 377. 
constant pressure for patronage commitments earlier in the year.'3' Further, a post- 
primary analysis of the race by James A. Farley revealed that Hamilton had not been as 
supportive of the New Deal as he might have been "voting to recommit four out of five of 
the President's bills."132 The administration fared no better in the mid-term elections in 
November 1938. The Republicans "picked up eighty-one seats in the House, won eight in 
the Senate, and captured a net of thirteen governorships."'33 This mammoth election 
defeat helped to mark the unofficial end of the New Deal. 
Despite the electoral setbacks anti-organization candidates suffered in Virginia's 
Democratic primaries, Roosevelt and Moore continued to try to strengthen the "antis." To 
do this President would have to cut directly into the organization's source of power in 
Virginia: patronage. As previously stated, Moore took a cautious approach to patronage 
issues when quietly assisting the "antis" throughout Roosevelt's first term and the first 
year of his second term, while being careful not to antagonize Byrd and Glass. The first 
signs of a change from the White House came several months prior to the failed purge 
attempts. In March 1938, Charles Harkrader printed an editorial in his paper, the Bristol 
Herald-Courier, which indicated that the president had given veto power over all federal 
appointments in Virginia to Governor Price. This announcement came a few days after 
131 Stephen Early to Marvin McIntyre, August 1, 1938, PPF 2467. McIntyre to Farley, January 19, 1938, 
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Harkrader met with the president in Washington, and it was soon printed in newspapers 
all over the state.134 
Senator Glass delivered a quick rebuke of the story and noted that as far as 
patronage was concerned "I am inclined to be.. . confident that the Virginia Senators will 
be conipletely capable of attending to such matters in the future, just as they have always 
done heret~fore."'~~ While Glass derided the article in public, in private he inquired about 
its authenticity by writing to Roosevelt. While Roosevelt acknowledged the senate's role 
in advising on appointments he refused to make any commitments to Glass. After a series 
of evasive answers from Roosevelt regarding the article's contention, Glass concluded 
that the substance of the article was true and that veto power on appointments had been 
granted to There could be little mistaking .the senator's intention not to give up 
his patronage powers without a figlit. According to his biographer, Senator Byrd, 
however, kept a lower profile in the aftermath of the announcement because of his 
upcoming reelection campaign in 1940 and his uncertainty over the strength of the 
There is no specific evidence that Moore directly contributed to Roosevelt's more 
aggressive approach in aiding the "antis" through patronage, but it is reasonable to 
assume his work on their behalf helped lay the groundwork for this decision. As many 
134 Alvin L. Hall, "Politics and Patronage: Virginia's Senators and the Roosevelt Purges of 1938," Virginia 
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historians have noted in relation to Roosevelt's purge attempts, the President was in a 
combative mood in the spring and summer of 1938. Roosevelt's formal extension of 
patronage power to Governor Price, in order to punish Senators Glass and Byrd for their 
consistent opposition to New Deal programs, fits well within the context of his other 
actions during this time.I3' 
By May 1938, a newly created federal judgeship in the Western District of 
Virginia set the stage for a patronage battle that would test the president's resolve to help 
the anti-organization members of the party and that would place Moore at the center of 
the action. When the vacancy arose "Senators Byrd and Glass, at the request of the 
attorney-general, submitted the names of Circuit Judge A.C. Buchanan, of Tazewell 
County, and Assistant United States District Attorney Frank Taverner." The "antis" the 
lead by Congressman Flannagan also put forth a candidate, Judge Floyd H. Roberts of 
~ r i s t o 1 . l ~ ~  ~ l a n n a ~ a n  collected references for Roberts from other anti-organization 
leaders across the state and then sent them to the White House in early ~une . '~ '  From the 
beginning, it was clear there would be a fight over the appointment as Glass privately 
confided to Byrd that he "would regard the appointment of Roberts as an intentional 
affront to the two Virginia Senators and would oppose confirmation accordingly."'41 The 
subsequent power struggle over this appointment became known as the "Roberts Affair." 
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On July 6, 1938, Roosevelt sent a brief note to Senator Glass informing him that 
"after mature consideration I have concluded that I should appoint Judge Floyd H. 
~ o b e r t s . " ' ~ ~  Roosevelt emphatically told Farley afterwards that he was "not going to let 
Glass or Byrd make any appointments in Virginia." The next day Glass sent "both a 
telegram and a letter" letting the president know that he and Senator Byrd would oppose 
the appointment. For their part, the "antis" could not have been happier with the 
president's bold departure from his patronage balancing act. Flannagan wrote Roosevelt 
declaring that you "will never know how happy the Roosevelt Democrats are all over the 
state." He continued proclaiming "I want to thank you for giving us such signal 
recognition. We have all taken new hope down here in ~ i r ~ i n i a . " ' ~ ~  Roberts's 
appointnient was a recess appointment because congress had already gone home for the 
summer. He would have to be confirmed by the senate the following year in order to be 
permanently installed in the position. In the meantime, Roberts would sit on the bench 
while R. Walton Moore led the administration's effort to secure his appointment. 
Moore was the natural choice to lead the effort for Roberts's senate confirmation 
because he had the greatest access of any "anti" to the president and was the most vital 
link between FDR and his Virginia supporters. The underlying rationale that Moore used 
to press the case for the importance of Roberts's nomination at the White House was 
purely political. From the beginning he told Governor Price, with whom he plotted 
strategy on the nomination, of a discussion within the administration that the governor's 
142 Roosevelt to Glass, July 6, 1938. 
143 Farley, Jim Farley 's Story, 161.Flannagan to Roosevelt, July 7, 1938, OF 2082, Roosevelt Papers. Letter 
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patronage power must be used "to maintain Virginia in a fairly liberal attitude relative to 
the contest of 1940. Without that there will be another story of the Virginia vote being 
tied up in control of a reactionary delegation."144 While in July 1938, no one within the 
White House, including Moore, knew for sure of Roosevelt's intentions for the 1940 race, 
he was certainly aware of Roosevelt's insistence on nominating a party liberal who would 
continue his New Deal policies if he chose not to run again. Hence, it was out of a 
perceived political necessity, rather than any other altruistic motive to help the "antis" 
that drove the president and other adniinistration officials to support Roberts's 
nomination. Roosevelt proceeded with the nomination despite the advice of Vice 
President John Nance Garner who counseled FDR saying, "There is no sense in playing 
with the Governor down there because he won't control the delegation in 1940. It will be 
controlled by the Glass-Byrd crowd."145 
Beginning in October, Moore began actively to strategize with Price and 
Roosevelt administration officials, including Tom Corcoran, who had been behind the 
failed effort to purge Smith, about the best way to conduct the nomination fight. He 
quickly determined that the "best and safest plan was to organize on [Roberts] behalf' 
and felt .that Alexander Sands, of Richmond, a prominent supporter of the president, 
should help gather evidence in support of Roberts from within the commonwealth. That 
same week Moore reiterated to Price his efforts at the White House on behalf of Virginia 
"antis" and other party liberals stating, "I have tried to impress upon important people 
144 Moore to Price, July 31, 1938, Price file, Box 16, Moore Papers. Letter quoted in Hall, "Politics and 
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here that the Virginia situation will become worse instead of better unless early and 
effective attention is given to the work that needs to be done in anticipation of the 
election year in 1940." He continued by emphasizing, "My interest in the [Roberts's 
nomination] situation is that of a citizen."'46 ~ o o r e ' s  private contention that his political 
machinations were only the impulses of an interested citizen is simply unrealistic given 
his record as such a strong Roosevelt partisan and supporter of the "antis." But 
throughout the nomination process Moore justified his involvement in state politics as 
just that of an interested citizen. Why he felt the need to qualify his involvement in the 
nomination process is unknown, but it most likely stems fi-om to his belief in the 
Revolutionary ideal of being called to service that he had cited throughout his own 
career. After all, intervening in a patronage battle within your own party hardly meshes 
with this noble ideal of a bygone era, and is more the action of a modem politician than 
that of revolutionary era statesmen. 
In any event, Moore and Price continued to plot their confirmation strategy over 
the next month. Just prior to Thanksgiving, Moore encouraged Price to "try to persuade 
Virginia newspapers, in spite of their general attitude, to urge the confirmation of Judge 
Roberts'[s] appointment." While the opposition of Byrd and Glass's respective 
newspapers was to be expected, if Price appealed to other papers around the state over the 
summer it had "no significant effect."147 A week later, Moore again wrote Price 
146 Moore to Price, October 15, 1938, Price file, Box 16, Moore Papers. 
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explaining that the opposition of Virginia's senators to Roberts's nomination "is perhaps 
at this time more or less doubtful." 
Moore could not have been more wrong about the certainty of their potential 
opposition. Since Roberts's recess appointment in July, Glass had been lining up 
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee to oppose his confirmation.148 Despite 
Moore's erroneous contention about the certainty of Glass's opposition to Roberts, he 
countered it by admitting that the potential for opposition was there and confided to Price 
that "It would not hurt our cause in Virginia for the Senators to succeed in blocking the 
nomination.. . ." This is the first instance, but certainly not the last, in which Moore 
expressed doubt about the likely success of his strategy to confinn Roberts and attain a 
greater share of federal patronage. He continued the letter, changing his tone 
dramatically, by essentially "suggesting that certain organization sympathizers holding 
federal jobs either be fired or transferred out of Virginia." He concluded by reiterating his 
reluctant involvement in the matter declaring, "I hope you realize that I do not wish to be 
in the Virginia political picture."149 Once again Moore sought to balance his competing 
need to be both an effective agent for Roosevelt and the "antis," yet try to preserve the 
image he had so carefully crafted as an elder statesmen whose motives were guided by 
history and duty. 
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By the following week, Moore was no longer "doubtful" about Glass's 
opposition, noting the senator's public prediction that the nomination would fail. He 
expressed fmstration with the Virginia press's refusal to acknowledge the variance 
between Glass's opposition to Roberts's appointment and his "repeated boasts that he 
does not concern himself about patronage matters." Moore had also come to an important 
conclusion about Roberts's confirmation, confiding to the governor that "whether it can 
be done effectively depends on the course the President will now take, relative not only to 
appointments and removals, but 
upon his general attitude in dealing with ~ o n ~ r e s s . " ' ' ~  Moore's conclusion would prove 
correct on botli fronts, but it would several months before this would become completely 
clear. 
As 1938 came to a close, Moore once again began to doubt Roberts's potential for 
success in the upcoming confirmation fight. Price replied to Moore's most recent letter on 
the subject by saying that he was "disturbed" over Moore's advice that Price should 
decide on a replacement candidate should Roberts's appointment fail.'" While Moore 
had by no means given up on the Roberts's nomination, he undoubtedly realized the 
power Virginia's senators would wield in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
As the year 1939 began, Moore was still plotting with Price about ways to 
advocate Judge Roberts's confirmation and alter Virginia's political picture. He 
suggested a number of measures that might "lessen the influence of our pretty tyrannous 
lS0 Moore to Price, December 3, 1938, Price file, Box 16, Moore Papers. Letter quoted in Koeniger, "The 
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Virginia political machine." Moore mentioned specifically to Price the idea that the 
governor select a "young newspaper man of marked initiative and courage" to do 
"publicity work" on behalf of the "antis." He contended that such a person would be 
valuable in rebutting the organization's attacks on Judge Roberts. Moore had heard that 
Glass would soon "unreservedly attack Flannagan" in a speech on the Senate floor, which 
would cite Flannagan's support of Judge Roberts. Moore also informed Price that he 
would also try to meet with the president after Roosevelt's annual address to Congress 
the following day.lS2 
On January 9, 1939, the Senate Judiciary Committee was informed by Senator 
Glass that the appointment of Judge Roberts was "utterly and personally offensive to the 
Virginia Senators." Byrd soon after quickly announced his public opposition to Roberts's 
nomination as well.'" Since both of Virginia's senators were now on record as opposing 
the nomination it formally brought forth the issue of senatorial courtesy. Roosevelt 
biographer James MacGregor Bums has perhaps most aptly described senatorial courtesy 
as a system in which " senators agree, in kind of unwritten mutual defense pact, to hold 
up a presidential nomination when the nominee is 'personally obnoxious'-i. e. a member 
of a hostile political faction."'" The relative infrequency of such a dispute led the 
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subcommittee to report the nomination to the whole Judiciary Committee without 
recommendation. 
Throughout the month of January leading up to the subcommittee's consideration 
of Roberts's nomination, Moore had continued to reassure Price of his support, urging the 
governor to "make use of me any way you think desirable.'' He also speculated on 
Glass's health and intentions, writing that "a friend ... tells me that [Glass] looks very 
badly but nevertheless it is still believed he will make a desperate attempt to block 
~ o b e r t s . " ' ~ ~  
Continuing his effort to publicize the Roberts nomination, Moore contacted 
Assistant to the Attorney General Joseph B. Kennan to ascertain how exactly the Roberts 
nomination came about. He sought this information in case he needed to speak with the 
press to combat Glass's version of events publicly at the upcoming hearing. Moore once 
again acknowledged the possibility of Roberts's rejection and the need to have a 
replacement candidate ready, but noted "I think a very strong showing should be made in 
his support, and all the publicity possible be given to the antagonistic attitude of the 
Virginia Senators as that will certainly help us in ~ i r ~ i n i a . " ' ~ ~  He later mentioned to 
Price his intention to give the Associated Press an interview once he had gotten all the 
facts of the case from Kennan. Moore's desire to acknowledge publicly his role in this 
political coiitroversy is in sharp contrast to his high-minded statements the previous year 
about wanting to stay out of the political picture. With even the optimistic Price 
' 5 5  Moore to Price, January 10, 1939, Price file, Box 16, Moore Papers. Glass, who was only a little more 
than a year older than Moore, had celebrated his eighty-first birthday the previous week. 
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acknowledging that things did not look good for ~ o b e r t s , ' ~ ~  Moore had begun 
increasingly to view the hearing on Roberts's nomination as a public relations event at 
which to expose Glass and Byrd's "dictatorial attitude. 7, 158 
The day before the Roberts nomination went before the subcommittee Moore 
wrote Price to update him on its prospects. Moore had been warned by Senator Key 
Pittman, chairman of the sub-committee, "that the Virginia Senators are making a very 
heavy fight."'59 Pittman's assessment would also hold true when the Senate Judiciary 
Committee considered the matter. In an open hearing on February 1 with "face flushed 
and eyes blazing, he [Glass] spoke of a conspiracy involving the president, the attorney 
general, and the governor of Virginia to humiliate him and his colleague."'60 Glass cited 
newspaper reports of Price's alleged veto power over appointments as evidence. In a 
dramatic impromptu exchange the governor denied that he had initiated Roberts's 
appointment and rebuked the idea that he had been given veto power over appointments. 
Glass responded by essentially repeating his charges about the governor's veto power. 
After the exchange, Price and former governors Westmoreland Davis and E. Lee Trinkle 
testified on Roberts's behalf. Glass's testimony opposing Roberts's confirmation took the 
form of recounting his correspondence with Roosevelt, whose evasive answers regarding 
Price's alleged veto power, confirnled the senator's conspiracy theory. For his part in the 
hearing, Senator Byrd simply repeated Glass's well-worn assertion that "this nomination 
157 Price to Moore, January 21, 1939, Price file, Box 16, Moore Papers. 
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was made for the specific purpose of being personally offensive and personally 
obnoxious to the senators from virginia."lG1 In a closed meeting that "lasted hardly five 
minutes" the committee voted 15-3 to report the nomination unfavorably. After the vote 
Congressman Flannagan, who first put forth Roberts's name for consideration, issued a 
statement reaffirming his support.162 Noticeably absent from the throng of Roberts's 
supporters at the hearing was R. Walton Moore. Despite his intimate involvement in 
promoting Roberts's nomination, Moore did not speak or appear on Roberts's behalf. On 
February 6, Roberts's nomination was officially defeated 72-9 in a senate vote. The 
margin of Roberts's defeat was reported to be the worst ever for a White House 
nominee. 163 
While Moore may have sensed beforehand the strong possibility of defeat in the 
Roberts matter, his indignation in its afternlath would not have revealed it. This sense of 
indignation was shared by the president himself, who in the aftermath of this 
embarrassing defeat on such a public patronage matter, struck back by making public a 
letter he sent to Judge Roberts. The letter was meant to reaffirm Roosevelt's confidence 
in Roberts, challenge Glass's sequence of events and rebuke the practice of senatorial 
courtesy.'64 Moore responded to Roosevelt's action by deriding Glass as "autocratic and 
bitter." Further, he complimented the president's letter to Judge Roberts and suggested 
"that great care should be taken in selecting a high class lawyer of irreproachable 
161 Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 2, 1939. 
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character who is friendly to the administration" to succeed ~ 0 b e r t s . l ~ ~  Moore's 
suggestion hints at reverting to the middle course he and FDR had successfully employed 
in dealing with Virginia appointments prior to the Roberts affair. This suggestion seems 
to have been the lone rational moment Moore enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of 
Robert's defeat. Glass's response to Roosevelt's letter, which among other things 
challenged the accuracy of much of the president's statement,166 not surprisingly did not 
sit well with Moore. 
In a rambling four-page memo marked "confidential," Moore unleashed a tirade 
of pent up frustration that among other things condemned Glass's and Byrd's actions in 
seeking an opposition candidate to Price in the 1937 gubernatorial race. Moore felt this 
was the Virginia senators' own attempt to "purge" their opposition. He further contended 
that the senators, who claimed to be Jeffersonian Democrats, had acted in a way in the 
Roberts affair that "is wholly inconsistent with Jefferson's conception" of appointments. 
Once again Moore had retreated to history to justify his current point of view. The 
counselor continued his written tirade by condemning Glass's refusal to answer his letters 
during the 1936 campaign and contended that the senator's silence had helped the 
opposition. The end of Moore's memo gave way to more thoughtful analysis of the 
political power structure in Virginia. Moore declared that "One difficulty in Virginia is 
165 Moore to Roosevelt, February 8, 1939, Box 75, PPF. 
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that while the President is very strong, most of the leading daily papers are favorable to 
~ ~ r d . " ' ~ ~  
Moore's analysis of the public-relations aspect of the struggle between the "antis" 
and the organization was indeed correct. For Moore and Roberts, this conclusion had 
come too late. Throughout his planning in support of Roberts's confirmation, Moore had 
confided to Price the public-relations benefit that would accrue from a hearing. He could 
not have been more wrong on this score. While some Virginia papers, like the Richmond 
News-Leader, criticized the senators' actions, the majority of those papers not associated 
with Glass or Byrd were either neutral or sided with Virginia's senators. For example, 
both the Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Washington Post (which enjoyed a large 
circulation in Northern Virginia) were highly critical of the administration's handling of 
the Roberts's nomina t i~n . ' ~~  Despite this evidence to the contrary, in the immediate 
aftermath of the debacle, Moore confided to Price "from what I hear the controversy over 
the Roberts's nomination had not been the least bit helpful to the Virginia ~ e n a t o r s . " ' ~ ~  
While Moore may have clung to this hopeful sentiment, the moment had passed. 
The failure of the Roberts's nomination should be shared amongst many 
including: Flannagan, who initially led the movement for Roberts; Price, who acquiesced 
to his nomination; and Moore, who promulgated the misguided belief that the 
controversy would damage Virginia's senators and strengthen the "antis." Indeed, 
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"Virginians had not looked favorably on the 'court packing' or the purges, and they saw 
the Roberts matter in the same light."l7' But, ultimately its failure must lie with 
Roosevelt, who made the decision to nominate Roberts in order to discipline Glass and 
Byrd for their consistent opposition to the New Deal and in an effort to assure a friendly 
Virginia delegation to the 1940 Democratic convention. What Roosevelt didn't realize 
was that "the court fight and the purge had pushed many legislators too far, and rejecting 
Roberts became one of the ways of telling the president that in the future he would have 
to work with and not above the other branches of government."171 
Roosevelt's heavy handed attempt to discipline Glass and Byrd by appointing 
Roberts failed and the public embarrassment over the defeat would continue to sting even 
as the president began to change course. While Roosevelt certainly took political advice 
from others such as Tom Corcoran, Jim Farley, and Harold Ickes about dealing with 
Virginia's senators, he had especially leaned on Moore because of his prior history with 
Glass. When Moore's judgment about the means to strengthen the Virginia Democratic 
Party proved faulty, Roosevelt did not cut him out of his circle of influence entirely, but 
he no longer entrusted him to do any of his bidding with the Virginia's senators. Much of 
Moore's last two years of service to the president was spent on foreign policy issues. The 
president, realizing the now tenuous nature of Moore's relationship with Glass and Byrd, 
170 Ed. Moore and Young, The Governors of Virginia, 285 
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began to increasingly rely upon his aide and Virginian Edwin M. Watson in dealing with 
them on patronage issues.'72 
With their challenge to senatorial courtesy soundly defeated, both Roosevelt and 
Moore would emerge from the wreckage of the Roberts affair more cautious in their 
approach to altering Virginia's political culture. Over the next two years, personal 
circumstances, as well as political events on the state, national, and, international stage 
would shape the future of Virginia's Democratic Party. While Moore's judgment about 
the impact of Roberts's nomination proved to be flawed, the aging Virginian was without 
question correct about one thing: the course Roosevelt chose to take not only decided 
Judge Roberts's fate, but over the next two years the president's choices would help 
permanently to determine the fate of Virginia's anti-organization faction. 
172 For an example of Watson's involvement in patronage issues see Glass to Watson, November 3, 1939, 
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Chapter I11 
1939- 194 1 : Retreat and Retirement 
A continued longing to help the "antis" take control over the state Democratic 
Party marked the final years of R. Walton Moore's tenure in the Roosevelt 
administration. For Moore and the "antis" it was unfortunate that in the aftermath of the 
Roberts affair the president would pay little heed to their cause. While the "antis" could 
still expect small favors from the White House, any outright challenge to the patronage 
powers of Virginia's senators lay in the past. 
For the next two yeads Moore's political activities were focused in two directions: 
aiding the president and the "antis" in securing a Roosevelt-friendly Virginia delegation 
at the 1940 Democratic National convention and constructing a valid historical argument 
supportive of the president seeking a third term should he chose to do so. While garnering 
the support of Virginia's political elite for FDR's nomination had been Moore's objective 
before the Roberts affair, it took on a singular importance afterwards and shaped virtually 
every communication he would have with Virginia's anti-organization leaders. 
The administration's outlook towards challenging Virginia's senators' control of 
patronage was no doubt altered by Roosevelt's newly conciliatory approach,'73 but it was 
not the president alone who advocated this approach in the aftermath of the Roberts 
affair. More than any administration official, the State Department Counselor cautioned 
173 A full examination of Roosevelt's change in political outlook and tactics in 1939-1940 is beyond the 
scope of this work. Historians have given many explanations for the shift in strategy including concerns 
over a myriad of foreign policy problems and .the need for Democratic votes on wartime preparedness. This 
essay will examine this change only as it relates to Roosevelt and Moore's political dealings with 
Virginia's senators. 
those within the administration and many of the "antis" of the necessity of including 
Glass and Byrd in consultations on appointments. 
In the months after the Roberts' affair, Governor Price sought to have the 
appointment to the highly contested judgeship vacancy "lay over for a while."174 Moore 
relayed this request and it was accepted. While Moore assured Price -that "nothing hasty" 
would be done on the appointment, he also informed the governor that none of Rep. 
Flannagan's choices to fill the position would be made because he doubted "whether the 
Virginia senators would allow the confirniation of anyone so strongly supported by 
Charles Harkrader continued to harbor ambitions of getting Roberts another shot 
at the post, but the moment had passed.176 By May 1939, Roosevelt had publicly 
acknowledged that he had sought consultation from the senators on the judgeship 
appointment.177 Moore would largely follow Roosevelt's cautious approach on 
appointments for the next two years, much to the frustration of the "antis." Repeatedly 
over the next two years Moore advised the administration that Virginia's senators be 
"sounded out" before a variety of appointments were made."17' 
Emblematic of the plight Virginia "antis" faced was Norman Hamilton, who, 
having lost the 2nd district Democratic primary to Colgate Darden, was searching for a 
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federal job, yet locked out because of his previous vigorous opposition to Glass and Byrd. 
It fell to Moore to inform Hamilton and his backers that "the Virginia senators would not 
allow him to be confirmed for any office and that he best think of some office that would 
not require confirmation." The point could not have been clearer when Moore said what 
was by this time apparent: "I was sure that the president would not care to make an 
appointment at this time which would involve him in an acute controversy with any 
senator."179 Moore was correct to assume senatorial opposition as their correspondence 
reveals that the senators were following Hamilton's quest for a federal job closely.180 As 
of April 1941, the administration was still lamenting Hamilton's situation with one of the 
president's private secretaries, Marvin McIntyre, commenting, "Confidentially we hope 
that something can be found for   or man."^^' Moore also realized the tenuous nature of 
his own relationship with the Virginia senators. In September 1939, when two 
appointments were to be made that required consultation with senators, Moore suggested 
that it should be handled by Roosevelt's aide Edwin Watson rather than himself. ls2 
Moore's suggestion that the matter be liaiidled by Watson was his realization that his own 
standing with Virginia's senators had been badly damaged by his involvement in the 
Roberts's affair. Moore adjusted his approach in dealing with Virginia's senators, 
allowing others directly to engage Glass and Byrd on the administration's behalf. This is 
a far cry from just several months prior when he considered making a public statement on 
179 Moore to Price, September 8, 1939, Box 16, Moore Papers. 
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Judge Roberts's behalf and unimaginable for the man who hounded Senator Glass to 
support FDR publicly throughout 1936. 
On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland and launched most of Europe 
into the Second World War, changing the course of history forever. The war also 
permanently altered the course Franklin Roosevelt took in dealing with Virginia's 
senators. Roosevelt, realizing he needed their support to insure passage of a repeal of the 
arms embargo portion of the Neutrality Act, "resolved to spare no efforts to regain the 
friendship" of Glass, Byrd, and other southern conservatives who had felt increasingly 
alienated since the proposition of the court-packing plan.183 The initial retreat from 
confrontation with Glass and Byrd that had begun after the failed Roberts nomination 
continued unabated in the wake of the Nazi invasion. Indeed, "Roosevelt's remarkable 
overtures.. .certainly facilitated the speed with which southern conservatives returned to 
the fold. Partly because of Roosevelt's [friendlier] attitude, all the southern conservatives 
not only backed repeal in 1939, but remained supporters of the administration's foreign 
policy throughout World War 11."'~~ 
This political armistice was not across the board as Glass soon emerged as one the 
most vociferous critics of the idea of a third term for the president. Moore's awareness of 
the necessity of both the Virginia senators' support of this key piece of foreign policy 
legislation made it easier for him to accept Glass's criticism of the president and to curb 
any actions by the "antis" which might anger the senator. Moore was intimately involved 
183 James T. Patterson, "Failure of Party Realignment in the South, 1937-1939," Journal of Politics, 27 
(August 1965), 613. 
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in securing passage of the key legislation and helped the president count votes.Ig5 
Moore's involvement in this process clearly made him more understanding of 
Roosevelt's dependence on southern conservatives like Glass and Byrd. While he still 
sought to aid the "antis" whenever possible, their protests about lack of patronage were 
now largely ignored by Moore as well. 
By the end of 1939 and beginning of 1940, both Moore and, to a much greater 
extent, Governor Price were growing increasingly negative about the administration's use 
of patronage in Virginia. In regard to two appointments, which went against the desires of 
the governor, Moore lamented, "I can not tell how greatly I regret any happening that 
lessens your opportunity to strengthen the administration in Virginia." Price later 
complained to Moore that recently we have had "only one appointment of any 
consequence."186 Price saw his power further eroded that spring as the organization- 
dominated general assembly sabotaged his legislative For the remainder of 
his term Price would concentrate most of his energies on Virginia's wartime 
preparedness.1gs The only major proposal from Price that the assembly passed in 1940 
was "a bill to raise the minimum teacher's salary and the revenue measures to fund it."'89 
His brief period of progressive reform in Virginia had ended just two years into his term 
as governor. 
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The efforts of R. Walton Moore and other "antis" to ensure a Virginia delegation 
that would be friendly to FDR or another New Deal candidate became increasingly 
difficult as it became clearer throughout 1939-1940 that Roosevelt had no intention of 
challenging Glass and Byrd again. At the same time, it was obvious that neither senator 
had any intention of allowing organization men to support any New Dealer. Given the 
situation, Moore concentrated on what he knew best, history, and how it might aid the 
president. 
More than any other single person, R. Walton Moore sought to research, 
synthesize and publicize a thoroughly documented historical work on the acceptability of 
President Roosevelt seeking a third term as president in 1940. There is no record of 
Moore being assigned this task by FDR or anyone else in the administration. He 
voluntarily began this effort to defend historically Roosevelt's run for a third term should 
he chose to do so. The chore combined Moore's love of early American history, 
knowledge of the founding fathers, and political know-how into one ongoing task, which 
he seemed thoroughly to enjoy. From early 1939, until the eve of the election in 1940, 
Moore concentrated his political energies largely in this direction. In many ways it was 
his greatest political service to the president he had longed to serve and would soon leave. 
Indeed, Moore's loyalty and admiration for the president were immense. In his 
autobiography, penned in November 1939, Moore exclaimed, "I may say that in the long 
line of very remarkable and often celebrated men I have met I do not find anyone 
possessing such a combination of astonishiiig qualities as those possessed by Mr. 
~ o o s e v e l t . ' ~ ' ~ ~  
While President Roosevelt never declared himself a candidate for re-election in 
1940, and instead sought to portray the image that he was being drafted,lgl many 
administration insiders felt in early 1939 that there was little doubt that he would seek the 
Democratic nomination. Among these insiders was R. Walton Moore, who by February 
1939, had already begun to anticipate the arguments that would be used against the 
president if and when he chose to do so. 
Moore's initial investigation brought out several points that would guide his 
argument throughout. First, that "it is not true, as often assumed that General Washington 
was opposed to the president filling more than two terms." Moore speculated on the 
possibility of Washington serving a third term and then emphasized that "the custom [of 
two terms] which has been observed had its genesis with Jefferson, who was influenced 
that a monarchy might be substituted for our system of government." Moore concluded 
his introductory argument by citing more recent statements in support of a third term by 
Senator William Borah (R-~daho) . '~~  
By May, Moore had begun to make contact with George Creel, an administration 
official who served as U.S. Commissioner of the Golden Gate International Exposition in 
San Francisco. Creel, who previously headed of the Committee on Public Information 
- 
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during the First World War and later served as the Washington correspondent for 
Collier's magazine, had a number of contacts in the publishing industry. He agreed to 
meet with Moore on this subject of "real importance."193 In establishing contact with 
Creel on the third term issue, Moore made clear to him his practical political aims 
immediately: "My deliberate opinion is that unless the president is a candidate to succeed 
himself a Republican will be elected." Moore mentioned his research on the third term 
issue but carefully noted that it was "independent of anything he [Roosevelt] has said or 
done." Moore took care not to implicate the president specifically in any of his research 
and planning. Moore and Creel also began an effort lasting through most of that year to 
place an article in Collier's magazine discussing the third term issue from a historical 
view advantageous to F D R . ' ~ ~  Moore must have been very persuasive because Creel was 
hardly an ardent New Dealer. In fact, Creel wrote two articles in 1937 about Senator 
Byrd for Collier's. The first praised Byrd's drive for economy and reduced spending in a 
time of deficits and the second promoted him as a possible presidential candidate in 
1 9 4 0 . ' ~ ~  Nonetheless, Creel worked with Moore to find a forum in which to argue against 
the two-term tradition. 
As Creel continued to try to set up a time over the next few weeks to meet with 
Moore, the latter continually researched and contemplated the third term question. Moore 
returned in a memo to the question of Washington's views on the issue, writing, 
"Washington.. .was much better aware than Jefferson that the framers of the constitution 
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did not intend to limit the election of an individual to the presidency.. .accordingly he was 
against the rotation [in office] theory."Ig6 B~ June, Moore had begun to review ideas 
Creel had generated for their article and began to make suggestions for improvement. 
These suggestions were largely rehashes of Moore's previous statements about Jefferson 
and Washington's views. '97 
Throughout his research, analysis and solicitation of a published article on the 
third term issue, Moore periodically informed the president of his progress. The second 
week of June, Moore summarized his dealings with George Creel for FDR and also 
informed him about the status of the neutrality legislation being considered by the House 
Committee on Foreign ~ f f a i r s . ' ~ ~  As the summer progressed, his correspondence 
indicates an increasing amount of time spent on foreign affairs and less on party politics, 
except for the third term issue. 
In late summer 1939, Moore was still refining and supplementing his arguments. 
The general argument about the tradition starting with Jefferson went unchanged but was 
supplemented by greater historical detail, for instance noting that Washington's "farewell 
address, gave no intimation that he would have considered the public interest menaced by 
his acceptance of a third term."'99 
A secondary argument that Moore was developing focused on the fact that many 
presidents had great difficulty obtaining a second term, much less a third and therefore 
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there was little need for the rotation-in-office theory which stood in Roosevelt's way. 
Moore mentioned specifically "that even counting Andrew Jackson, only three presidents 
have served eight years from Jackson's time to the present."200 A year prior to the 1940 
presidential election, in November 1939, Moore began to press Creel for a first draft. 
Creel replied with a complete draft, but noted that "I think that it is going to be a chore to 
get it published."201 
Over the next month Moore and Creel again traded suggestions about the article's 
historical content and argument. Moore once again reiterated the practical importance of 
the assignment because the "political evolution now in progress strengthens my 
conviction that unless he [Roosevelt] is again our candidate.. .the enemy will take charge 
of the government."202 Creel replied to Moore by submitting a copy of the final article, 
but he had already received notice that the article was 'too historically inconclusive.' 
Creel then speculated that "had it been conclusive in the sense of certifying the third term 
tradition is absolutely sacred, there is no question that [William L.] Chenery [Collier's 
editor and publisher] would have leaped at it." Despite the setback, Creel infomied 
Moore that he would shop the article around to Reader's Digest and Harper's 
~ a ~ a z i n e . ~ ' ~  
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The article submitted to these various publications used most of Moore's 
suggestions and even mimicked much of his language. It rebuked the idea that the third- 
term tradition actually began with Washington and did so with statements from many of 
the founding fathers. The article traced the evolution of the debate from the early 
Republic until 1928, when the matter was last considered because of the possibility that 
Calvin Coolidge might run again.204 
While Moore continued to entertain the historical issues at hand over the idea of a 
third term, he also put out feelers as to party sentiment. The first of these went to 
Nebraska Governor Edward Howard. Moore sought from Howard what the "trend is with 
reference to the election next year of a Democratic candidate for the presidency."205 
Moore would continue throughout the remainder of 1939 and through 1940 to gauge the 
feeling of Democrats about the nomination. 
The day after Christmas 1939, he informed FDR of the Collier's rejection and 
noted that "he did not attach that much importance to the disinclination of magazines to 
deal with the question." After lengthily rehashing the historical arguments in Roosevelt's 
favor, Moore made his own pitch to the president as to why he should run again. "For 
many months I have thought and still think that unless you are retained in office your 
successor will be a Republican with the result that domestic policies become largely 
reactionary. But even worse would be the loss of the only leadership, which at the end of 
the war could be exerted with tremendous influence to make fair adjustments and find 
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some method of insuring a more peaceful world." This statement is the best summation 
of Moore's views as to why he felt it necessary that Roosevelt serve a third term. Beyond 
his personal affinity for the president, and their shared views on domestic issues, Moore 
genuinely believed that Roosevelt was the one most capable of keeping the United States 
out of World War 11. He also felt the president would possess the most skill in crafting a 
just peace. This motivation became evident publicly in Moore's speech to .the Virginia 
General Assembly the following month. Moore concluded his very personal letter to 
Roosevelt writing "this frank expression is not dictated by any personal ambition.. .I can 
not hope to hold on much longer."206 The fact that Moore wrote in such "frank" terms to 
the president on such an important matter again shows the degree of loyalty and 
admiration he held for FDR and his genuine feeling that he might be a voice in 
convincing the president to run again. The passage is also vitally important because 
indicates in his correspondence with others that he may not serve much longer in office. 
A month prior, Moore had predicted privately that the Roosevelt would run again and 
win, but noted that "I would have no thought of serving beyond the beginning of his new 
term."207 
While Moore seemed quite certain about his own retirement, he became 
increasingly sure that despite Roosevelt's statements to the contrary, the president would 
undoubtedly seek a third term and the arguments he helped to craft would prove useful. 
Evidence of this belief is found in an address Moore gave to the Virginia General 
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Assembly in February 1940. Moore was invited to the address the General Assembly by 
Governor Price. The occasion for such an address is unclear. 
The octogenarian's address was dedicated largely to the greatness of the 
president. Moore did include some historical anecdotes, but the speech largely focused on 
FDR. Moore first set out to dispel the rumors of a run for a third term telling the Virginia 
lawmakers not to "believe that he [Roosevelt] is scheming and planning for his own 
benefit." He continued lavishly praising the president saying, "He is one of the few men I 
know of who fits the biblical description of greatness." He also credited Roosevelt's 
domestic program and in an indirect way took a poke at Byrd's economy drive saying 
"We heard a good deal of talk about our increasing debt and our extravagance. But we 
may well ask ourselves what would have happened without the program that has been 
developed and who was better fitted to develop it than the president?" Finally, Moore, 
once again leaning on history to advocate for his current political views proclaimed "we 
have an energetic central government such as Washington recommended years ago."208 
The analogy of the New Deal's rapid expansion of the federal government and the idea of 
a strong national government in Washington's day may have been a stretch, but the 
speech overall was well received. The highlight of the address came when Moore 
addressed the growing crisis in Europe and proclaimed "We do intend that our people 
shall never again be involved in war." The Richmond Times-Dispatch reported that the 
"assembly applauded vigorously as they did when he spoke of the greatness of the 
*08 Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 7, 1940. 
president."209 While U.S. involvement in the war was still uncertain, Moore despite his 
speech's felt certain FDR would seek a third term. It should be noted that there is no 
proof to believe Moore, or anyone else for that matter, had any concrete knowledge of the 
president's intentions. 
By the spring of 194.0, Moore seemed to have given up on the idea of having 
George Creel try to publish an article on the third term issue. Instead, he used the 
information he had collected and the arguments he had developed over the past year to 
aid Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Ickes had begun compiling a chronicle of 
historical information supportive of the idea of a third term.210 Moore also continued to 
monitor political developments as they arose, but other than surveying third term 
sentiment within the Democratic Party and occasionally helping Ickes with a historical 
question, his political role seemed increasingly diminished. 
At the 1940 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Franklin Roosevelt was 
again selected by party delegates as the Democratic nominee for President. This did not 
happen without considerable opposition, most notably from the Democratic Party 
Chairman, Jim Farley, who was "opposed to the principle of the third term."21' Senator 
Carter Glass placed Farley's name in nomination. In speaking on Farley's behalf Glass 
assailed the idea of a third term on historical grounds. Glass said that Jefferson appealed 
to the Democratic Party, just prior to his death, never to nominate someone for a third 
209 Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 7, 1940. 
210 Moore to Ickes, April 26, 1940, Ickes to Moore, April 29, 1940, Third Term for President File, Box 19, 
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term for the presidency.212 Despite Roosevelt and Moore's best efforts in 1938 and 1939 
to use patronage to help determine the make up of Virginia's delegation to the 
Democratic National Convention, it did little good. In the end, the Virginia delegation 
"split its votes among [Vice-President] Garner, Roosevelt, Hull and ~ a r l e ~ . " ~ ~ ~  It is also 
interesting to note that "Virginia was the only state not officially represented in the big 
Roosevelt demonstration" that took place on the floor of the convention when 
Roosevelt's name was placed in n~mina t i on .~ '~  
Moore did not attend the convention, "but kept up with the proceedings" and 
noted to FDR three days after his re-nomination that Glass was the "only one.. .which 
made specific reference to the third term question." He mentioned sarcastically that "it 
started me wondering whether Glass had forgotten that Mr. Jefferson was not only an 
advocate of rotation in presidential office but an advocate of rotation in senatorial office, 
and were he now on the scene would probably say that Glass had overstayed his proper 
limit."215 Moore also updated Roosevelt on his work, mentioning the information he 
supplied Ickes and promising that "should the third term issue prove serious I shall take 
what may be my last political step in the way of a historical address or article meant to 
212 Ibid., 286. 
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show how little validity attaches to the third term traditi~n.""~ Here again, Moore 
affirmed his desire to step down at the conclusion of Roosevelt's second term. 
Roosevelt responded to Moore's letter reflecting on the convention's events and 
deriding Glass by writing, "It was no fun at the moment.. .I had to consent to run again. 
What a pity that poor old Carter made such a sorry spectacle of himself in ~ h i c a ~ o . " " ~  
While Roosevelt and Moore may have made peace with Glass over patronage, their 
exchange on the convention's events reveals the bitterness both still felt. For his part, "the 
Senator announced his intentions to vote for the Democratic ticket in the general election, 
but as in 1936, he refused to take an active part in the campaign."218 
Throughout the remainder of the summer of 1940, Moore continued to monitor 
sentiment on the third term issue and plan accordingly. One example of this behavior is 
his measured response to an editorial in a Falls Church, Virginia, newspaper that was 
critical of Roosevelt seeking a third term. Moore wrote to an attorney friend and 
Roosevelt supporter, George Robey, that "to publish a response now at the threshold of 
the campaign would perhaps serve to attach too much importance to a statement which in 
my opinion is going to have very little effect."'19 If Moore felt this way it must have been 
fleeting because he continued to construct arguments in his support of a third term. 
In September 1940, Harold Ickes published "The Third Term Bugaboo: A 
Cheerful Anthology," which was a campaign pamphlet in defense of Roosevelt's run for 
-- - - 
216 Ibid. 
217 Roosevelt to Moore, August 3, 1940, PPF 2605, Roosevelt Papers. 
218 Koeniger, "Unreconstructed Rebel," 230. 
219 Moore to George Robey, Third Term for President File, Box 19, Moore Papers. 
a third term.220 The main arguments presented strongly echoed those given to Ickes 
several months before by Moore and the pamphlet is based largely on materials the latter 
obtained. This was especially evident in terms of the section of evidence covering 
Washington's writings on the possibility of a third term. Ultimately, Ickes's main 
argument was that those opposed to Roosevelt's run for a third term were hypocrites 
because many of them have been supportive of the idea in the past when it involved other 
candidates, such as Calvin Coolidge and Woodrow Wilson. 
Ickes was by no means the only partisan in the 1940 campaign to delve into 
history in order to support their view of whether Roosevelt should seek a third term. 
Young B. Smith, dean of Columbia University's Law School, also wrote a pamphlet on 
the issue with a very different tone. The pamphlet carried the approval of the National 
Committee of Democrats-for-Wilkie. This was an organization of renegade Democrats 
supporting the president's Republican opponent Wendell Wilkie. 
Young's recounting of history was largely similar to that of Moore and Ickes. He 
acknowledged in fact that it was Jefferson to whom "more than any other belongs the 
credit for the establishment of the third term principle."221 What differed sharply from 
Ickes's and Moore's arguments were Smith's conclusions about the applicability of the 
principles involved to present conditions. Smith concluded his argument with a laundry 
list of complaints about Roosevelt's uses of executive power and predicted that with the 
oncoming war and "the delegation of war powers to the president, it is not difficult to 
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visualize what can and probably will happen to our democratic form of government and 
our way of life if the principle against a third term is discarded."222 
With these arguments continuing to compete for public attention throughout the 
early fall and into the final weeks of the campaign, R. Walton Moore prepared himself 
for one last political speech in which history was to be his guide. He composed a series of 
speech drafts in the second week of October and prefaced the last draft by affirming his 
desire to retire. The drafts cover many of the same arguments he had already outlined in 
reference to Washington and Jefferson. They also go farther in quoting both Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson in favor of a third terni. Moore concluded his last dated 
draft of October 14, 1940, with a personal assessment of the president's intentions and 
ambitions. He wrote, "I know perfectly well that his decision to be a candidate indicates 
no desire to exercise power but the desire of a great American citizen to serve his 
Here, once again, Moore's love and knowledge of American history, 
combined with his personal affinity towards FDR, had helped to shape his argument. 
Unfortunately, Moore never gave his campaign speech because of health 
problems. He continued to monitor the political situation and correspond with fellow 
Roosevelt supporters about any opposition to third term, but was unable to take a more 
active role as he had in 1 936.224 Three weeks later, on November 7, 1940, Roosevelt was 
re-elected to an unprecedented third term as president, carrying all but a handful of 
- 
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states.225 Despite Senator Glass's vocal opposition to a third term, reliably Democratic 
Virginia once again went for Roosevelt. The popular vote for Roosevelt in Virginia was 
virtually identical to that he received in his 1936 landslide victory over ~ l f   ando on.^^^ 
Whether Moore's historical arguments had any significant impact on outcome of 
the election is doubtful. But, what is not questionable is the depth and accurateness of the 
historically-based arguments themselves. In completing this final deed for the president 
he so admired, Moore had combined his knowledge of American history and skill as a 
lawyer in helping the administration develop arguments for and counter arguments 
against a third term. In terms of his political accomplishments, it yielded little public 
payoff, but was an important contribution to the campaign nonetheless because it 
provided a detailed historical basis for Roosevelt's run with for a third term which was 
certainly a pivotal issue in the contest. 
With his health declining after an attack of pneumonia in December and no 
political battles left to fight, Moore prepared to retire. Harold Ickes recorded at the 
beginning of 1941 that Moore was "in bad health and that, even if he recovers, he will 
resign shortly."227 Ickes was not far off at all. On January 27, 1941, Moore sent his 
resignation letter to the president. The letter references his declining health and his 
admiration for Roosevelt, saying "I wish you to know my feeling that I could have had no 
higher privilege and honor than to serve under your great leadership during your service 
225 The New York Times, November 8, 1940. 
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for two terms in the presidency, which I am glad is now extended for another term."228 
Roosevelt responded in kind, writing "I want you to know that I deeply regret your 
decision that you must leave the department. You being there in these days of stress and 
anxiety has been a very real comfort to me." The president continued "I look forward to 
9, 229 seeing you as soon as your health will permit you to come in. Unfortunately, Moore's 
health never allowed for another visit with the president. 
Just over a week after his retirement from the State Department, R. Walton Moore 
lapsed into a coma and died on February 8, 1941, in his Fairfax home.230 Beside the 
lifetime bachelor were his two sisters, Helen Moore and Margaret Ellen ~ o o r e . ~ ~ '  On 
hearing the news, Governor Price ordered the flag at the State Capitol to be flown at half 
staff in Moore's honor.232 His memorial three days later was attended by numerous 
dignitaries including Secretary of State Cordell Hull, former Ambassador to France 
William Bullitt, Governor Price, "Representative Smith who succeeded Mr. Moore in the 
House, [and Representatives] Darden, Thomas Burch and Otis S. Bland. The White 
House was also represented by Capt. Callaglian and Mrs. James Helm, Mrs. Roosevelt's 
personal secretary."233 The president also sent a personal message to Helen Moore, 
reading "your brother was an old and devoted friend whose passing is a personal 
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grief."234 Noticeably absent from the funeral procession were both of Virginia's senators 
with whom he had battled with over politics and patronage since his appointment in 
1933. 
R. Walton Moore was remembered as lie no doubt would have wished. Secretary 
Hull recalled Moore as a "person of unusual ability, high purpose, a profound student of 
both domestic and international affairs, who possessed character and patriotism of the 
highest order."235 A Washington Evening Star editorial on his passing perhaps 
summarized his personal legacy best: "Mr. Moore died, as he had lived, a Virginia 
gentleman in the best meaning of the phrase. He was devoted to his native state beyond 
the capacity of ordinary language to report. Its history he mastered in meticulous detail. 
The Old Dominion never had a son more profoundly concerned to preserve the 
chivalrous spirit of the past."236 Moore was buried on a hillside next to the graves of his 
mother and father in Fairfax, Virginia, where he lived his entire life. 
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Conclusion 
The political impact of R. Walton Moore on Virginia politics during the first two 
terms of the Roosevelt administration is very difficult to measure. Unlike Senators Glass 
and Byrd and even Governor Price, Moore played a small public role. While he made a 
few speeches and authored several newspaper editorials, his role was primarily limited to 
the influence he could bring to bear on the president, senators, and opinion makers 
around the country. Perhaps more important than any influence Moore may have had is 
what he represented. Moore was a vital link from the anti-organization faction of the 
Virginia Democratic Party to the White House. Here he served not only to voice its 
concerns over federal patronage and the implenientation of federal programs in Virginia, 
but his close contact with "anti" leaders gave them a legitimacy they had not known 
before. Moore's easy access to the president insured the "antis" would at least have some 
manner of voicing their views, which would have otherwise been ignored by the 
organizaiion. This relationship between Moore and the "antis" was significantly 
strengthened with Governor Price's election. 
The three major political tasks Moore undertook during his almost eight years in 
the Roosevelt Administration were uniting Virginia's political elite behind Roosevelt's 
re-election in 1936, ensuring the "antis" a significantly greater share of federal patronage, 
and developing a historically based rationale for a third term. All achieved varying levels 
of success. Moore's first task was to help ensure a united Virginia Democratic Party 
behind Roosevelt in 1936. This meant assuring the support of both of Virginia's senators 
who had voted largely against the New Deal and by 1936 had become its vocal critics. 
Byrd, with whom Moore had little contact or influence, did endorse the president, albeit 
reluctantly. Despite months of trying to convince Glass to speak on Roosevelt's behalf, 
the senior senator was steadfast in his refusals and never did endorse Roosevelt publicly. 
Moore, who had relied so heavily upon his relationship with Glass, unquestioilably failed 
in this venture. But Moore's small failure cost FDR little, as he easily won Virginia and 
re-election as president. 
The second major task Moore engaged in was ensuring that a greater share of 
federal patronage in Virginia go to the "antis." This policy evolved from simply choosing 
candidates that would not openly offend Glass and Byrd to one of challenging them 
directly through the selection of Judge Roberts who was championed by virtually every 
"anti" in Virginia. Both Moore's and Roosevelt7s motivation in seeking a fight with the 
senators went beyond the issue of the "antis"' share of patronage. This fight was in many 
ways the opening battle for control of the Virginia delegation to the Democratic National 
Convention in 1940. Ultimately, Moore's plan backfired when Roberts was easily 
defeated for confirmation in the senate. Roberts's defeat ended any significant efforts on 
the part of the administration to alter the distribution of federal patronage in Virginia. 
While the final decision to nominate Roberts was the president's, there is no question that 
Moore deserved a considerable portion of the blame for the defeat. Moore's 
correspondence reveals that he was without question one of the primary movers behind 
the decision and in fact more than anyone else in the administration championed the 
appointment. His predictions that public opinion would go against the senators on the 
issue were also completely off base. 
Moore's misjudgment of public and political sentiments over the Roberts 
nomination is significant because the defeat altered Roosevelt's domestic political course 
in dealing with Virginia. While the president continued to extend small favors to the 
"antis" such as the delay of an appointment, by the spring of 1939 he had begun to repair 
the rift between himself and the Virginia senators. Once Roosevelt changed course, R. 
Walton Moore's role as an emissary to the senators and advisor on Virginia politics 
effectively ended. While Moore continued to try to aid the "antis" there was little he 
could really do without the full support of the White House. 
The final major political task Moore took on was his research, analysis, and 
presentation of historical information regarding the third-term tradition. It was without 
question the only unqualified success in domestic politics that he enjoyed during the 
Roosevelt administration. The task was well suited to Moore's strengths, which included 
an extensive knowledge of the documents of the founding fathers, and an ability to draft 
clear and compelling historical arguments to suit his political purposes. Unfortunately, he 
received little credit for his efforts, as Harold Ickes ultimately published the information 
Moore compiled and synthesized in his own pamphlet. Nonetheless, Roosevelt was aware 
of Moore's work and from his correspondence it is evident he valued Moore's efforts on 
his behalf. 
Given the mixed results Moore achieved in the attempting these three major tasks, 
he leaves a mixed political legacy. While his value as emissary to the Virginia senators 
had quickly diminished by the time of the 1936 elections, he did serve as critical link to 
the White House for the "antis." Unfortunately, Moore's legacy, like all other major anti- 
organization Democrats, must be evaluated on his effectiveness in altering the course, 
nature, and outlook of the Virginia Democratic Party. Virginia historian and Byrd 
biographer, Ronald Heinemann, has written that "throughout the thirties there was never 
a formidable enough opposition to the organization on which to build a challenge to its 
Proof of the anti-organization Democrats' lack of power by 1940 is seen in the 
fact that Byrd ran unopposed in the Democratic primaries for re-election that year. 
Heinemann's statement rings especially true in the aftermath of the Roberts's affair as 
Roosevelt conceded control over Virginia's federal patronage to Glass and Byrd. Prior to 
this concession, the "antis," orchestrated by Moore, did have at least the potential to 
challenge the senators for control of the party. After the Roberts's affair, lacking the 
backing of the leader of both the nation and the Democratic Party, that potential quickly 
evaporated, leaving Moore's efforts as little more than a footnote in Virginia's political 
history. The organization would control the Virginia Democratic Party for another 
generation. 
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